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I. INTRODUCTION
Wilkinson famously eulogized the Prior Appropriations
system in 1991.1 Recent Supreme Court cases raise the question of
whether such a eulogy is now appropriate for the Commerce Clause
as it relates to bulk water transfers across state lines. During the
1980s several key cases settled doubt that water is article of
commerce and a commodity. 2 The fungible nature of water
frustrates water resource managers and economists alike, meaning

1

Charles Wilkinson, In Memoriam: Prior Appropriation 1848-1991.
21 ENVTL. L. 3. (1991). This work was followed by Benson, R. D. (2011).
Alive but irrelevant: The Prior Appropriation Doctrine in Today's Western
Water Law. U. Colo. L. Rev., 83, 675.
2

Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). City of El Paso v.
Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379 D.N.M. (1983).
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it is ‘property’ that does not exhibit all ‘traditional’ properties of
ownership.3 The legal commoditization of water corresponded with
an increase in academic research calling for open markets for bulk
water sales, allowing for water to be reallocated to higher economic
uses.4 Sporhase v. Nebraska and City of El Paso v. Reynolds were
instrumental in knocking down economically protectionist statutes,
creating a trend towards a ‘borderless commons’ for resource
reallocation.5 Fast forward to 2014 and bulk water transfers are still

3

Olen P. Matthews, Fundamental Questions about Water Rights and
Market Reallocation, 40 WATER RESOURCES RES. No. 9 W09S08 (2004).
George A. Gould, Water Rights Transfers and Third-party Effects, 23
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW 1-41 (1988); Olen P. Matthews, Water
is not Real Property. 85 WATER RESOURCES UPDATE 19 (1991).
4

Dinar, A., & Letey, J. (1991). Agricultural Water Marketing,
Allocative Efficiency, and Drainage Reduction. JOURNAL OF
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT, 20(3), 210-223
(1991). MacDonnell, L. J. Recent Developments in Water Marketing and
Water Transfers. JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY W ATER RESEARCH AND
EDUCATION, 79(1), 5 (2011). Anderson, T. L., & Turner, J. A. Marketing
the West’s Life Blood. JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY W ATER RESEARCH
AND EDUCATION, 92(1), 4 (2011).
5

Borderless commons is also referred to as a borderless national
market. See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant
Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICHIGAN L. REV. 395
(1989).
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fraught with problems,6 including unclear property rights, and high
costs of transport. 7
Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann ET AL has
brought the transferability of water across state lines into question. 8
Tarrant Regional Water District (Tarrant) provides water to suburbs
of Dallas including Fort Worth. The district’s population has been
fast growing.9 To keep pace with growing water demands,10 Tarrant
has actively sought to acquire water using a variety of means,
including purchasing water rights from parties in multiple states and

6

Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting Names Right:
The Myth of Markets for Water, WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
317-77 (2000).
7

For a thorough review of types of transaction costs associated with
natural resource transactions, see K. Krutilla, Transaction Costs and
Environmental Policy: An Assessment Framework and Literature Review,
4 INT’L REV. OF ENVTL. AND RESOURCE ECON., 261-354 (2010); K.
Krutilla, & A. Alexeev, The Political Transaction Costs and Uncertainties
of Establishing Environmental Rights, 107 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 299-309
(2014).
8

Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann ET AL. 569 U.S.
614, 614 (2013).
9

Id.

10

The 2007 Texas State Water Plan estimates Dallas-Ft. Worth
water demands to increase from approximately 1.2 million acre-feet per
year in 2000 to 3.35 million acres—feet per year by 2060. See, e.g.,
TEXAS WATER DEVELOPMENT BOARD 2007,
http://www.twdb.texas.gov/waterplanning/swp/2007/index.asp.
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attempting to appropriate water in Oklahoma for use in Texas. 11 In
Tarrant, the Supreme Court prevented Tarrant from obtaining a
water right in Oklahoma based on the Red River Compact.
On its face, Tarrant required the court to address commerce
clause limitations on Oklahoma water allocation statutes, while
simultaneously delving into whether an interstate compact preempted state law. However, instead of using Oklahoma water law to
claim unappropriated water within the Kiamichi River Basin,
Tarrant claimed the existence of unallocated water under the Red
River Compact. This circumvention of the normal appropriation
process allowed the Court to evaluate the compact using contract
law principles; the Court then determined the compact’s language
showed insufficient intent to pre-empt Oklahoma’s statutes. The
Court avoided any significant discussion of the commerce clause.
That said, the decision runs contrary to contemporary trends in both
water resource management, which call for integrated watershed-

11

Tarrant attempted to make an appropriation of unappropriated
water on the Kiamichi River in Oklahoma.
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level management,12 and neo-classical economics, which call for
borderless-markets for efficient commoditization and reallocation
of resources.13 The decision also runs contrary to the Court’s
previous decisions to ignore state boundaries when both states use
the Prior Appropriations system. 14
The Supreme Court framed Tarrant’s position as follows: 1)
The Red River Compact pre-empts Oklahoma statutes giving
Tarrant “the right to cross state lines and divert water from
Oklahoma”15 within a specific portion of the river where the
Compact grants “equal rights to the runoff.”16 “In Tarrant’s view,
this provision essentially creates a borderless commons in which
each of the four signatory States may cross each other’s boundaries

12

C. Howe, The Return to the River Basin: The Increasing Cost of
“Jurisdictional Externalities”, 131 J. OF CONTEMP. WATER RES. AND
EDUC. 26-31 (2005).
13

David S. Brookshire, et al., Ecosystem Services and Reallocation
Choices: A Framework for Preserving Semi-Arid Regions in the
Southwest, 144 J. OF CONTEMP. WATER RES. AND EDUC. 60-74 (2010).
14

See, State of Montana v State of Wyoming and State of North
Dakota 131 U.S. 1765 (2011); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419
(1922).
15
Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann ET AL., 569 U.S.
614 (2013) at 9.
16

Id. at 615.
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to access a shared pool of water.” 17 2) “Tarrant argues that the
Oklahoma water statutes impermissibly “‘discriminat[e ] against
interstate commerce’ for the ‘forbidden purpose’ of favoring local
interests” by erecting barriers to the distribution of water left
unallocated under the Compact” (emphasis added). 18 In rejecting
these arguments, the Court makes statements raising critical issues
for water managers.
First, the Court ignores the fact authority over water is
shared—not

exclusive.

Placing

substantial

emphasis

on

“sovereignty” provided the Court with the justification for finding
the Red River Compact does not pre-empt Oklahoma water
allocation law.19 However, the sovereignty argument ignores the
historic interplay and tensions between state and federal authority
over water; it also disregards the requirement for sharing between
states. Water is an inherently shared resource that cannot fit under
traditional notions of ownership and sovereignty.20 While ignoring

17

Id. at 616.

18

Id. at 617.

19

Id.

20

Olen P. Matthews, The Dominate Water Estate and Water
Reallocation, 144 J. OF CONTEMP. WATER RES. & EDUC. (2010); George
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the shared nature of water management the Court seems to indicate
there is something unmanageable with a “borderless common in
which each of the fours signatory States may cross each other’s
boundaries to access a shared pool of water.”21 Such reasoning is
peculiar because political boundaries are artificial constructs
running contrary to watershed management. Although a completely
borderless commons may not be politically feasible, reducing
borders as much as practicable is a commonly stated water
management goal22, as well as fundamental principle of neo-

A. Gould, Water Rights Transfers and Third-Party Effects, 23 LAND AND
WATER L. REV. 1 (1988).
21

Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann ET AL. 569 U.S. 614
(2013) at 627-28. “But if §5.05(b)(1)’s silence instead reflects a
background understanding on the part of the Compact’s drafters that state
borders were to be respected within the Compact’s allocation, then the
Oklahoma statutes do not conflict with the Compact’s allocation of water.”
22

Water managers frequently cite a common goal of integrated
(holistic) watershed management. J. Hoornbeek, & E. Hansen, (2013).
Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) in the United States: An
Inquiry into the Role of Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs). INT’L J.
OF WATER GOVERNANCE, 1 (3), 339-360 (2013); Eve Vogel, Parceling
Out the Watershed: The Recurring Consequences of Organizing Columbia
River Management within a Basin-Based Territory. WATER
ALTERNATIVES 5(1), 161-190 (2012). “This goal can only be achieved by
erasing the boundaries as much as possible.” Olen P. Matthews and Dan
St. Germaine, Boundaries and Transboundary Water Conflicts, 133 J. OF
WATER RES. PLANNING AND MGMT. 386-396 (2007). Water managers
frequently cite a common goal of integrated (holistic) watershed
management.
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classical economics. A borderless commons could have a positive
impact on water management. Second, by narrowing Tarrant’s
commerce clause arguments to water “left unallocated under the
compact”, the whole issue of Oklahoma’s blatant and intentionally
discriminatory statutes is left unresolved. These two points form the
focus for our discussion below.
Because of the Red River Compact’s singular language and
Tarrant’s argument based on “unallocated” water, the implications
of this case are unclear. But this precedent brings into question the
ability to divert or market water across state boundaries. Interpreted
at its margin this decision represents a reversal of trends towards a
national free-market of water as a commoditized good. 23 We argue
that Tarrant, in spite of some language within the decision, should
not fundamentally constrain water transfers across state boundaries.
II. SHARED AUTHORITY OVER WATER
John Wesley Powell recognized dividing watersheds with
state boundaries would create water management problems. 24 His

23

See, Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982); City of El Paso
v. Reynolds 563 F. Supp. 379 D.N.M. (1983).
24

JOHN W. POWELL, A REPORT ON THE LANDS OF THE
ARID REGION OF THE UNITED STATES 31 (2nd ed. 1878).
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fear of states incessantly fighting over borders, water allocation, and
fishing rights, instead of managing watersheds as an interdependent
resource, was prescient. 25 His recommendation of using watershed
boundaries as political borders instead of rivers was ignored, and
States have been at odds ever since. In 1879 when Powell made his
report, individual water users in the arid West were ignored at the
federal level giving states leeway to develop a system for allocating

Powell’s A Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United
States, suggested using watershed boundaries instead of rivers as political
boundaries. He also suggested development in the western United States
needed to occur with recognition of the limited freshwater supplies. Id. at
27.
25
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water.26 Powell did not foresee the heavy federal presence that
evolved subsequently. 27
A. The Fiction of State Sovereignty
In Tarrant, the Court draws on an 1842 Supreme Court
decision28 based on river bed ownership to describe the attributes of
sovereignty. “We have long understood that as sovereign entities in
our federal system, the states possess an ‘absolute right to all their

26

The federal government did not have the resources in the sparsely
settled West to resolve water disputes even if they desired. Local custom
evolved instead which in the later part of the 1800s became the basis for
the western states’ appropriation doctrine. A similar process happened
with mining law in the West. In the early 1800s the U.S. developed a lease
system for minerals on the frontier. The lease law was unenforceable
partly because the program was inadequately administered. For example,
rents were only collected for one year between 1836 and 1846. See, e.g.,
Robert W. Swenson, Legal Aspects of Mineral Resources Exploitation in
GATES, PAUL W. HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW
DEVELOPMENT at 705 (1968). The lease system was abandoned in 1846
the sale of specific mineralized lands was authorized. California was not
included in the authorization. When gold was discovered in 1849 the
California miners were in fact trespassing on federal land when they
extracted minerals. A vacuum existed at the local level and mining camps
developed their own rules for establishing property rights and resolving
disputes. In time these local practices were codified as the Mining Law of
1866 and 1872. Arguably a federal system for allocating water could have
developed, especially on federal land and in the territories. See also, Irwin
v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855). These same miners needed water for their
placer claims and local customs based on “first in time, first in right”
evolved for water as well.
27

Supra note 26.

28

Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842).
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navigable waters and the soils under them for their own common
use’” (emphasis added). 29 Most definitions of sovereignty use terms
like “supreme and absolute power”, “paramount political authority”,
or “absolute right to govern.” 30 But, is sovereignty a concept that
applies to water? Within an international context sovereign states
(countries)31 are independent and exercise jurisdiction over their
territory, resources, and citizens. Even sovereign countries have
obligations under international law which restrict the “absolute”
exercise of power. 32 Obligations are especially important since
absolute power over water can be exercised in ways that cause
substantial harm to other country’s interests. Water is a mobile
resource with individual molecules moving through the hydrologic
cycle independent of political boundaries. Indeed, only one of the

29

Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N. J. Law, 1 at 14-15. (Since the issue in the
case was the ownership of the river bed (soil beneath the navigable water)
the reference to the water itself is dicta.).
30

Black’s Law Dictionary available at thelawdictionary.org.

31

We will use the term country when referring to an internationally
recognized state to avoid confusion with the term state which is also used
for governing units within the U.S. federal system.
32

For example, the Mekong River Basin Commission is an intergovernmental agency that has worked to create clear expectations of each
nation on how it treats the Mekong River and its principal tributaries.
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world’s 264 large river basins is undivided by a political boundary. 33
This necessitates some form of sharing.
Four major theoretical approaches have been advocated for
governing international waters.34 First, “absolute territorial
sovereignty”35 allows upstream countries to use water as they chose
with no obligation to prevent harm to downstream countries. This
seems to be the position taken by the Supreme Court in Tarrant.36
Second, “absolute riverine integrity” prevents upstream countries
from reducing the full natural flow of the river thereby benefiting
downstream countries. Third, “equitable utilization” limits
territorial sovereignty by allowing each country to use an equitable
and reasonable share of the water. Fourth, the “community theory”

33

The Murray-Darling River Basin is entirely within Australia. The
other 263 largest basins cross at least one international boundary. Shim
Yoffe, Shira, Aaron T. Wolf, and Mark Giordano, Conflict and
Cooperation over International Freshwater Resources: Indicators of
Basins at Risk, 39 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN W ATER RESOURCES
ASSOCIATION (2003) at 1109.
34

Joseph W. Dellapenna, International Water Law, in Water and
Water Rights, §49.03 (Robert E. Beck ed. 1991).
35

Carolin Spiegel, International Water Law: The Contributions of
Western United States Water Law to the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Non-navigable uses of International Watercourses, 15 DUKE
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) at 348.
36

The Circuit Court decision seems even more extreme in its
embrace of this approach.
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advocates river basin development as a unit without regard for
political boundaries. Although, the first two doctrines have been
advocated at different times these have never been accepted at
international law 37 equitable utilization is the current standard.38 The
community theory is more recent and would virtually erase the
political boundary. Equitable utilization at international law goes
beyond the concept of equitable apportionment which will be
discussed below. Equitable apportionment as developed by the US
Supreme Court requires the benefits of water use be shared and not
just the allocation of water.
Kansas v. Colorado, a dispute over the Arkansas River,
illustrates how several of these theoretical approaches were
articulated. 39 In 1906, large dams and major diversions for irrigation
and other purposes were just becoming technically feasible.
International water law was largely limited to navigation disputes as
were most disputes between U.S. states. This controversy helped

37

U.S. advocated absolute territorial sovereignty Harmon Doctrine.
See also, state arguments in Kansas v. Colorado.
38

International Law Association. Berlin Conference 2004. Water
Resources Law. Fourth Report at 4.
39

Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
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shape early international water allocation law because of the way
the Court approached a dispute between equal sovereigns. The
international aspect of sovereignty is illustrated by the Court’s
stating it was “sitting …as an international, as well as a domestic
tribunal.”40 Colorado was following the approach espoused in 1895
by Attorney General Judson Harmon. 41 The Harmon Doctrine
evolved as the result of a dispute over the Rio Grande between the
U.S. and Mexico but was later repudiated. 42
Kansas as the downstream state argued for absolute riverine
integrity. “The State of Kansas appeals to the rule of the common
law that owners of lands on the banks of a river are entitled to the
continual flow of the stream…”43 Flowing water provided an energy
source for mill wheels with water being valued more for its energy
than for other uses. Interfering with the flow harmed the mills. The

40

Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 146 (1902).

41

Judson Harmon, 21 Op. U.S. Att’y Gen. 281 (1895).

42

This doctrine never developed as the standard under international
law and arguably was not actually used by the United States. See, Stephen
C. McCaffrey, The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred Years Later: Buried,
Not Praised, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 549, 565 (1996).
43

Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 146 (1902).
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natural flow theory would require Colorado to leave the river
untouched benefiting downstream Kansas. 44
In their subsequent decision the Court adopted the standard
of “equitable apportionment.”45 This new federal common law
doctrine articulated a principle based on sharing, but Kansas was not
allocated a share of the river because they could not prove they were
being harmed.
“[W]e are not satisfied that Kansas has made out a
case entitling it to a decree. At the same time it is
obvious that if the depletion of the waters of the river
by Colorado continues to increase there will come a
time when Kansas may justly say that there is no
longer an equitable division of benefits and may
rightfully call for relief against the action of
Colorado, its corporations and citizens in

44

As the Court points out accepting this theory would not necessarily
benefit Kansas irrigators since the next downstream state could make the
same argument. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). This point was
noticed by irrigators in western Kansas who objected to the use of this
doctrine. See, JAMES E. SHEROW, WATERING THE VALLEY:
DEVELOPMENT ALONG THE HIGH PLAINS ARKANSAS RIVER,
1870-1950, University Press, Kansas (1990).
45

Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 at 47 (1907). The idea that state
sovereignty could be limited when one state harmed another had already
been accepted by the Court in a water quality dispute over the Illinois
River. A public nuisance created in one state causing harm in another was
within the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. Although state sovereignty was
restricted by enunciating the principle, the harm to the downstream state
could not be proven. Missouri v. Illinois and Chicago, 200 U.S. 496
(1906).
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appropriating the waters of the Arkansas for
irrigation purposes.” (emphasis added)46
The Court did leave open the door by stating Kansas could
“institute new proceedings whenever it shall appear
that through a material increase in the depletion of
the waters of the Arkansas, …the substantial
interests of Kansas are being injured to the extent of
destroying the equitable apportionment of benefits
between the two States resulting from the flow of
the river.”(emphasis added) 47
The doctrine of equitable apportionment evolved as a
limitation on a state’s territorial sovereignty creating an obligation
on upstream states to share the benefits of the water originating
within their boundaries. 48 As this standard evolved it has been
limited to an actual apportionment of a “share” or quantity of water
rather than an apportionment of the “benefits” of the water use. This
is playing out in the current dispute in the ApalachicolaChattahoochee-Flint (ACF) Basin, as Georgia and Florida seem
entrenched in their respective positions on flow dimensions and

46

Id. at 47.

47

Id. at 47-48.

The exact nature of the elements that create an “equitable
apportionment” were eventually defined but were left open ended and
flexible. Although the rules have been articulated for an equitable
apportionment, the Supreme Court rarely actually apportions a quantity of
water and prefers states resolve disputes through compacts.
48
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equity.49 The two states invoked an Interstate Compact, but the
compact expired in 2003.50 Even the use of a “Special Master” 51 did
not create a determination of equity the Court deemed satisfactory.
As a result litigation over flows in the ACF is ongoing.
In 1966, the Helsinki Rules, a precursor in the evolution of
international water law, stated “each basin state is entitled, within
its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses
of the waters of an international drainage basin.” 52 This is the
doctrine of “beneficial uses,” which is perhaps closer to the Supreme
Court’s original articulation which included an “equitable division
of benefits” and certainly implies more than just an allocation of a
quantity of water. As international law has evolved there may be

49

Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502 (2018).

50

Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact P.L.
105-104 (1997).
The Special Master’s recommendation suggested Georgia receive
a disproportionate quantity of water in this system stating, “Florida has not
proven by clear and convincing evidence that its injury can be redressed
by an order equitably apportioning the waters of the Basin.” Id. 51 at 2502.
The Court determined the Special Master “applied too strict a standard
when he determined that the Court would not be able to fashion an
appropriate equitable degree.” (See footnote 51 at 2516). This suggests the
Court will, if no negotiated settlement is reached, judicially allocate
waters.
51

52

The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International
Rivers, Chapter 2, Article 6 (1966).
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even more limitations on sovereignty than exist in disputes between
U.S. states. International law emphasizes the “fairness” or “equities”
“rather than… a strict application of legal rights.” 53 Thus sharing the
benefits includes a share in the hydroelectricity generated by a dam
located entirely within one country. Although equitable utilization
includes sharing the benefits of water use, it allows independent
development on each side of a boundary, and the boundary is not
completely erased.
The doctrine of “equitable participation” goes one step
further and includes integrated watershed-scale management, the
process looking at the entire river basin when making water
management decisions.54 Water managers have long advocated this
as a way of optimizing water use. Although there is a growing
movement toward integrated management at the international level
it is not fully articulated. “Many modern treaties apparently take the
principle of shared rights or common use as a presumed starting
point of departure and proceed without articulating any general rule,

53

Joesph W. Dellapenna, International Water Law, in Water and
Water Rights, §49.05(b)91 (Robert E. Beck ed. 1991).
54

Id.
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to spell out the specifics of their sharing of responsibilities….” 55 In
1997, a U.N. Convention specifically recognized a duty to
cooperate, consult and negotiate. 56 The Berlin Rules also recognize
a duty to consult and negotiate. 57
At the international level limitations are imposed by U.N.
conventions on sovereignty in transboundary watersheds58. This is a
long way from the absolute power advocated under the Harmon
Doctrine. In many ways the international obligations and limitations
on sovereignty far exceed those that exist for U.S. states. There is a
difference, however. In the U.S., a “superior” federal government
also has power over water. The U.S. Constitution also limits state
powers and puts in place mechanisms for resolving disputes
between states. Sovereignty does NOT mean absolute power when
it comes to water; it never has. To further understand these

Stephen M. Schwebel (Special Rapporteur of Int’l Comm’n),
Third Rep. on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/348 (1982).
55

56

U.N. Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/51/49 (May 21, 1997).
57
58

Id.

Aaron T. Wolf, A Long Term View of Water and International
Security, 142 J. CONTEMP. WATER RES. & EDUC. 67, 67-75 (2009).
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limitations on state power, the balance between state and federal
power over water needs to be examined.
B. Balancing Federal and State Power
Federal regulatory power over water has gradually increased
over time. This evolution is comparable to the changing
relationships between the state and federal governments within the
U.S. federal system. 59 One significant dividing point is the
Reclamation Act of 1902. Prior to this, the exercise of federal power
was generally limited to navigation. Government roles before the
Reclamation Act are discussed in the first section below. The
Reclamation Act itself was a compromise between federal power
and local interests as will be discussed in the second part.
Subsequent federal statutes used other constitutional justifications
other than the navigation justification. As long as there was a
constitutionally enumerated power, this federal expansion was

59

Four components of this federal system have been identified: 1)
state sovereignty and constitutional limits on that sovereignty; 2) federal
power; 3) relationship between federal and state governments; and 4)
relationship between the states. All four of these components are important
in understanding how water is managed. None of the components can be
looked at in isolation. Thus, state sovereignty can only be understood by
also examining the constitutional limits on sovereignty, federal power, and
the obligations to other states; Robert A. Sadler, The Constitution and the
American Federal System, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1487, 1488 (2004).
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upheld. The main constitutional powers exercised are under the
Commerce Clause and the Property Clause as discussed in the third
section.

Lastly,

this

article

will

discuss

congressional

apportionment. Over the past 100 years the scale of water
management issues has changed, and the balance between state and
federal power has shifted as the role water plays in development,
ecosystem services, and agricultural and fisheries production has
been better understood and re-evaluated.
1. Pre- “Reclamation Era” roles
Before 1902 the federal role in water management was
limited in scope. This is partly due to the scale of the management
concerns of that era. Except for navigation, most water management
issues were local. During this period the balance between state and
federal power depended on the definition of “navigable water.” 60
The Constitution does not specifically mention water, but the
Commerce Clause affirmatively gives the federal government the
power to “regulate commerce” which includes power over

60

The designation of a navigable waterbody means actions
interfering with navigable commerce must be precluded; United States v
Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967).
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navigation.61 With an almost non-existent road system water
transportation was the backbone for moving goods from one place
to another when the U.S. was founded. The federal Commerce
Clause power is not exclusive; states also retain the capacity to
regulate commerce. 62 State attempts to restrict “commerce” through
protectionist laws led to the evolution of the dormant or negative
Commerce Clause. 63 Protectionist state laws are consistently
deemed unconstitutional, as will be discussed in more detail
below.64
Whether federal power extended beyond navigable waters
was an open question. Other federal constitutional powers like the
Property Clause, treaty power, and spending power potentially
granted the federal government authority to directly or indirectly
affect water. Generally, issues concerning these other constitutional

61

Gibbons v. Ogden, 221 U.S. 1 (1824).

62

Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).

63

Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); Wilson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co.,
27 U.S. 245 (1829); See generally Norman G. Williams, Gibbons, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1398 (2004); M.H. Redish and S. V. Nuegent, 1987 The
Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of
Federalism. DUKE L. REV. 4, 569-618 (1987).
64

Sporhase, supra note 24; Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v.
Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992).
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powers did not arise with regard to water in the 1800s. The rule was
clear that, if Congress exercised one of its specific constitutional
powers, that law was supreme and pre-empted contradictory state
laws.65
With federal power over navigable waters being well settled
in the 1800s, it became a regular practice for Congress to pass an
annual

Rivers

and

Harbors

bill

financing

navigation

improvements.66 Politicians of that era did not feel there was
constitutional authorization for federal flood control levees and
reservoirs, federal projects to drain wetlands, or federal reclamation
projects.67 On the other hand, the benefits to the local politicians
from navigation improvements were well recognized and the almost
annual Rivers and Harbors Acts were broadly supported. 68
Non-navigational federal water initiatives that could not be
developed through direct means were accomplished indirectly. Two
65

Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).

66

See Rivers and Harbors Act of 1879, 21 Stat. 37 (created the
Mississippi River Commission to improve navigation on the river).
67

See generally, ELLIS L. ARMSTRONG, ET AL., HISTORY OF PUBLIC
WORKS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1776-1976 (Amer. Public Works Assoc.,
1976).
68

See generally, O.P. MATTHEWS, WATER RESOURCES:
GEOGRAPHY AND LAW (Assoc. of Amer. Geographers, 1984).
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basic indirect strategies were developed to bypass the perceived
restrictions on federal power. One strategy was designed to provide
federal funding for big projects the states could not afford.69 The
Federal government had one asset that was not restricted by the
constitution- federal land. The federal government could donate
federal land to the states, states could sell the land, and the proceeds
could be used for water projects.70 Thus, through indirect means
states were provided funds for draining swamps,71 building canals,
72

and for reclamation projects.73
The second indirect method involved states claiming a

project benefited navigation when the major impact was actually for
another purpose. This method became increasingly common as the

69

Id.

70

See generally, DONALD PISANI, W ATER, LAND, AND LAW IN THE
WEST: THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC POLICY, 1850-1920 (University of Kansas
Press, 1996).
71

See, e.g., Swamp Land Acts of 1849 (9 Stat. 352), 1850 (9 Stat.
520), and 1860 (12 Stat 3). Over 64,000.000 acres eventually went to states
under a series of Swampland Acts; See PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF
PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT, at 325 (Public Land Law
Commission, Wash. D.C., 1968).
72

GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT, at 325.
In 1827 and 28 grants were made to Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Alabama.
73

The Carey Act, 43 Stat. 2610 (1894). This act was largely
unsuccessful (See Gates, at 650, supra note 73; Pisani, at 104, supra note
71.)
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1800s progressed, because of the high rate of success in getting these
projects funded. Thus, the federal government constructed levees to
improve navigation even though they also prevented floods, and
constructed reservoirs to improve navigation by capturing debris,
even though the reservoirs also prevented floods. Discharging refuse
into navigable waters was prohibited because it could interfere with
navigation.74 By the end of the 19th century federal power had been
extended to tributaries of navigable water bodies and other sources
affecting a water body’s “navigable capacity.”75 Since western states
were developing laws allowing streams and rivers to be depleted for
irrigation, and even sometimes completely dewatered, state
“irrigation” potentially could conflict with federal “navigation.”
During this period federal power over water was limited to
navigation related water issues, but this power was none the less
substantial. All that was needed was a link to navigation which
Congress was increasingly willing to find.

74
75

The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. 403 (1899).

Id., prevented excavations or filling that would affect the
navigable capacity of navigable waters; See also United States v. Rio
Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
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Perhaps the most important “state” water management role
was in defining water rights. Property rights are generally defined
by state law, rather than federal law. In the east, water rights were
considered an attribute of riparian land ownership and were thus
defined by each individual states’ property law. 76 Land owners
decided how water was used, and conflicts between riparian owners
were resolved in court as were disputes over land. 77 State water
management agencies did not exist. The riparian rights doctrine did
not work as a property rights system in the western states and
territories.78 Water could only be used on adjacent land limiting the
amount of developable lands and could not be diverted outside a
watershed.79 Miners needed water for placer operations and often
had to seek water courses miles from their claims to find it. Irrigators
had a similar problem; the lands immediately adjacent to a river
were often not ideal for production, and upland areas required
extensive irrigation works to supply water. Out of need, a new

76

See O.P. Matthews, supra note 69.

77

Id.

78

See Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855).

79

See O.P. Matthews, supra note 69.
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system of water rights, the appropriation doctrine, evolved. 80 The
appropriation doctrine grants a temporal priority to anyone who
intentionally diverts water from a watercourse and applies it to a
beneficial use,81 and land ownership is not required. 82
The end of the 1800s was a crucial turning point in the scale
of water management. Western states were formalizing a system for
establishing water rights separate from land ownership.83 The annual
Rivers and Harbors Acts had dropped the “navigation” justification
for spending federal funds.84 Levees and dams were authorized for
flood control, not just navigation. 85 A significant change was made
in 1890 when the annual Rivers and Harbors bill moved from
funding projects to prohibiting interference with a water body’s
navigable capacity. 86 Bridges, dams, and channel alterations now

80

See Irwin, supra note 79.

81

See generally O.P. Matthews, supra note 69.

82

Early California miners operated on public land they did not own.
They were in fact trespassers. Without ownership they had no riparian
right; Irwin, 5 Cal. 140 (1855).
83

See O.P. Matthews, supra note 69.

84

Rivers and Harbors Act, supra note 75.

85

River and Harbor Act of 1890 26 Stat. 426 §13 (1890); River and
Harbor Act of 1892 27 Stat. 88 (1892).
86

Id.
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required federal permission. 87 The major irrigation projects being
contemplated during the 1890s would have to comply with this
federal requirement. The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899
reauthorized the 1890 requirement88 and added a permit requirement
for the discharge of refuse. 89 This early environmental statute was a
substantial assertion of federal power. The integrity of navigable
waters was being protected not just the water’s “navigable
capacity.” Discharges into tributaries of navigable water also
required a permit.90 Before 1900 the federal government had
asserted strong interests in water. This is the same period that
western states were developing statutory frameworks for allocating
water rights.91 These state water rights could not be exercised in
ways that interfered with the federal requirements.

87

Id.

88

Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 30 Stat. 1121 §10
(1899).
89

Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 30 Stat. 1121 §13
(1899).
90

Id.

91

See generally, Pisani, supra note 71.
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2. The Reclamation Act Compromise
By the time the federal Reclamation Act passed in 1902, the
appropriation doctrine was well established. State constitutions or
statutory provisions recognized it, 92 and courts had endorsed it. 93
Even so, the appropriation doctrine was a cobbled together system
designed to solve specific local problems. Not until the Wyoming
Constitution and water code (enacted in 1890) did comprehensive
water laws emerge. 94 The Wyoming Constitution asserts state
ownership of all the water within the state’s boundaries. 95 Other
state codes evolved in time with many claiming water “ownership”
in state’s name or for the “public.” Even though state or public
ownership was asserted, each code created rules for establishing
private property rights held by individuals, corporations or local

92

See Article 14 of the California Constitution (adopted in 1879),
which directed that water be regulated and controlled by the State. The
Colorado Constitution, at Article 16, § 5 (1876), declared unappropriated
water in the State to be the “property of the public.”
93

Irwin, supra note 79; Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Company 6 Colo.
443 (1882).
94

ROBERT E. BECK & OWEN L. ANDERSON, INTRODUCTION AND
BACKGROUND, 11 Waters and Water Rights § 11.04(b) (2012).
95

WYO. CONST. art 8, § 1.
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governments.96 These property rights are “use” (usufructuary) rights
that can be sold under defined circumstances.97 In spite of the
substantial interest claimed by states under the state ownership
doctrine, allowing water to be sold in private transactions makes
water a commodity. The public’s interest in market transactions was
nominally protected, 98 but this protection had a very low bar capable
of being passed by any economically beneficial use. 99
The Reclamation Act was a game changer in the
administration of western water allocation law. States had no
systematic method for adjudicating water rights creating substantial
uncertainty within the existing property rights systems. Why should

96

See generally, Pisani, supra note 71.

97

See Gould, supra note 4.

“Of the 19 member states of the Western Governors Association,
12 states contain some form of broad statement that approval of a water
transfer cannot run contrary to the general interest of the citizens of the
state”; Mike Pease, Water Transfer Laws and Policies: Tough Questions
and Institutional Reform for the Western United States, 4 [J] NAT.
RESOURCE POL’Y RES. 103, 112 (2012).
98

99

Beneficial use is loosely defined. For example, South Dakota
defines beneficial use as “reasonable and useful and beneficial to the
appropriator, and at the same time is consistent with the interests of the
public of this state” S.D § 46-1-6(3). For a more detailed overview of
beneficial use, see generally Robert Beck & Owen L. Anderson,
Elements of Prior Appropriation, 11 Waters and Water Rights §11.01
(2012).
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the federal government spend money on large reclamation projects
when existing water rights were unknown? Fear that speculators
would claim water rights in areas prior to a federal project led to a
push to reform state laws.100 Wyoming’s comprehensive approach
was adopted in some western states while other states adopted the
Bien Code.101 The Bien Code is a model water allocation code
developed around 1903 by the federal Reclamation Service. Unclear
state laws and unadjudicated water rights prompted a more
systematic approach to water management. 102 Before large projects
were approved or funded, the Reclamation Service encouraged
states to adopt a comprehensive code. These codes clarified the
existing systems for establishing water rights and resolving
conflicts. When the Reclamation Act was eventually passed,
Congress deferred to these state laws allowing states to control water

100

This was a catalyst for the relation-back doctrine, which attempts
to clarify expectations for the progression and finalization of a water
diversion, see generally Coffin, 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
101

See F.M. PHILLIPS, G.E. HALL, AND M.E. BLACK, REINING IN
THE RIO GRANDE: PEOPLE LAND, AND WATER, (UNM Press, 2015).
102

See W.A. Hutchins, J.P. DeBraal & H.H. Ellis, Water Rights
Laws in the Nineteen Western States, at 458-59 (U.S. DEPT. OF AGR.,
NAT. RESOURCE ECON. DIV., 1974).
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rights.103 Federal authority over navigation and commerce was
retained.
States were also motivated to adopt comprehensive codes by
the fear of federal authority over water rights.104 As the owner of the
public domain, the federal government had a strong claim to water
“ownership.”105 The federal Irrigation Survey had identified 147
reservoir sites by 1890, 106 poising the federal government to be a
player in western irrigation. The federal threat to western state’s
allocation systems could not be ignored, but states required federal
financial support to develop large irrigation projects.
The debates leading up to the Reclamation Act of 1902 show
that there was substantial disagreement over the way federal and
state roles should be balanced in reclamation projects. 107 The
original bill introduced by westerners gave the states almost

103

See Pisani, supra note 71.

104

See Pisani, supra note 71, at 64.

105

See Kansas v. Colorado (1907) where the U.S. intervened and
made this argument. Although the Court did not support the federal
position this was an unknown when the Reclamation Act was being
negotiated and during its early implementation.
106

Pisani, supra note 71, at 163.

107

See Pisani, supra note 71.
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complete power over projects and rendered the federal role to
financing.108 This was met with a tepid reception from eastern
senators and congressmen who wanted a more expansive federal
role. Subsequent western concessions were insufficient to move
eastern interests.109 Eastern politicians were reluctant to approve a
bill that would be costly and of no benefit to their constituents. Only
President Roosevelt’s veto threat to the pending Rivers and Harbors
Bill, which largely benefited eastern interests, brought the
Reclamation Act to a vote. 110
When the Reclamation Act was first passed the federal
government did not have a system for establishing water rights. 111
States stepped into this void and actively granted water rights in
1902, even though their systems for doing so were still a bit

108

See generally Pisani, supra note 71; LAWRENCE J. MACDONELL,
FROM RECLAMATION TO SUSTAINABILITY: W ATER, AGRICULTURE AND
THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE AMERICAN WEST (1999).
109

To accomplish this, the Bureau of Reclamation established longterm contracts with irrigation districts and individual irrigators. Within
these contracts were long-term pricing agreements for water deliveries
and repayment schedules for the irrigation works. For a review of the
success of these projects, see generally Pisani, supra note 71;
MacDonell, supra note 108.
110

See Pisani, supra note 71, at 319.

111

Pisani, supra note 71.
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chaotic.112 The western congressmen who supported the Act made
sure that this power remained with the States.113 States could
establish property rights, but those rights could not interfere with
other federal powers.114 After being largely silent during the 1800s,
Congress and the Supreme Court were more willing to recognize an
expanded federal role.115
C. Muddying the Federalism Waters
After the Reclamation Act, the first Supreme Court case
addressing the federal role in water management was Kansas v.
Colorado. discussed above. The extreme positions taken by Kansas
and Colorado threatened the future of federal irrigation projects
which prompted the federal government to intervene. 116 If Kansas’
position was upheld the ability to divert water for reclamation
projects would be destroyed. 117 Although the federal government

112

Id.

113

Id.

114

See ROBERT E. BECK & AMY K. KELLY, THE LEGAL REGIMES,
Water and Water Rights § 4.02 & 4.03 (2012).
115

Id.

116

Douglas L. Grant, Equitable Apportionment Suits Between
States, § 45.02, in Water and Water Rights (LexisNexis 2012).
117

Id.

118
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liked Colorado’s appropriation doctrine, it did not like Colorado’s
claim of absolute power over water as it would negatively affect
interstate commerce. 118
The federal position in Kansas v. Colorado seems a bit
extreme in light of the specific congressional deference to state
water allocation law, but the states also had extreme positions.
Neither state recognized the rights in the other state. Colorado
attempted to argue full control over its portion of the Arkansas
River, citing state sovereignty over the watercourse as it passes
through state territory.119 Kansas took an opposite, yet similarly
uncompromising position arguing Colorado had no right to disrupt
the natural flow of the Arkansas River. 120 Such extreme positions
exemplify the protectionist actions that necessitated the commerce
clause. None of the extreme positions were accepted, but a balance
between state and federal rights was recognized.
In the next year, federal power over water was once again
before the Supreme Court. The Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in

118

Amy K. Kelly, Federal Reclamation Law, § 41.04, in Water and
Water Rights (LexisNexis 2012).
119

Supra note 118.

120

Id.
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Montana was created by federal action in 1888. 121 Over the next
decade, the tribes used water from the Milk River for irrigation and
domestic purposes. 122 After the federal reservation was created,
Montana citizens acquired water rights using Montana law on the
Milk River.123 Because the water supply was insufficient for all
users, a conflict developed. 124 In Winters v. United States 125 the
Court addressed whether the creation of the reservation set aside
water for tribal use or whether Montana acquired control over water
by attaining statehood. 126

121

Winters v. U. S., 207 U.S. 564, 567 (1908).

122

Id.

123

Id.

124

Id.

125

Id.

126

Winters v. U. S., 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908). The Court stated:
“The power of the Government to reserve the waters and exempt them
from appropriation under the state laws is not denied, and could not be.
United States v. The Rio Grande Ditch & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, at
702; United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371. That the Government did
reserve them we have decided, and for a use which would be necessarily
continued through years” In United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371
(1905), the Court upheld the rights of Tribes to hunting and fishing
rights, stating, “…the Treaty of 1859, was not a grant of right to the
Indians, but a reservation by the Indians of rights already possessed and
not grated away by them.”
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By 1908, state laws were subservient to federal law if the
navigable capacity of a stream was harmed or if the federal
government reserved water. 127 Anytime the federal government
reserves land, a federal water right is created. 128 This reserved rights
doctrine was viewed as an exception under Indian law until it was
expanded in 1963.129 The federal right supersedes any state right
created subsequent to the federal reservation. 130 The volumetric
limit of the right is defined by an amount sufficient to accomplish
the purposes of the federal reservation. 131 This reserved rights
doctrine was viewed as an exception under Indian law until it was
expanded in 1963.132
As the federal presence in other aspects of water
management grew, 133 deference to state laws that established water

127

Gibbons (1870), supra note 61., Id. at 577-78.

128

Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 548 (1963).

129

Id.

130

Winters (1908), supra note 121.

131

Id. at 703-05.

132

Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 548 (1963).

133

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or
abrogate rights to quantities of water which have been established by any
State. The Clean Water Act of 1977 § 101, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (West
2018).
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rights were provided in federal statutes. Federal “deference” to state
law allows individuals to obtain water rights and sell those rights but
does not capitulate other federal powers over water. Rather,
deference to a state’s water rights laws is a very limited form of
deference; the substantial federal presence in water regulation would
be untenable if such deference gave states the power to veto federal
laws.134
The exercise of these federal powers has frequently been
challenged, but almost always upheld. For example, in U.S. v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’
power to determine ‘waters of the United States’ as laid-out in the
Clean Water Act was upheld. 135 Federal jurisdiction can even extend
to non-navigable watercourses if a “significant nexus” exists
between those watercourses and a navigable stream. 136

134

Sporhase, supra note 3.

135

U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 121

(1985).
136

Rapanos v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715, 742 (2006) (The case does not
include as broad a definition of “waters” of the U.S. as some members of
the Court advocated, but it is not as restrictive as others proposed. The
nuances of this case are beyond the scope of this article).
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D. Congressional Apportionment
In Kansas v. Colorado, the Supreme Court expressed doubt
that Congress had power to apportion water in a dispute between
two states.137 The Court held for federal power over water extended
to federal lands through the constitution’s property clause, but that
congressional power “cannot determine the rule which shall control
between the two states.”138 The Court also refused to enforce the law
of one state on another, and instead used federal common law
(equitable apportionment) since there was no other choice to resolve
the dispute. Federal congressional authority seemed to be limited to
navigation and instances where there was federal property. This
decision came at a time of transition in the balance between state
and federal power. Western states had begun claiming ownership of
water shortly before this, 139 while at the same time the definition of

137

Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 117 (1907).

138

Id. at 94.

139

Most prior appropriation states claim ownership over water, but
reserve the right for its appropriation by citizens willing to that water to a
‘beneficial use.’ For example, New Mexico law states, “All natural
waters flowing in streams and watercourses, whether such be perennial,
or torrential, within the limits of the state of New Mexico, belong to the
public and are subject to appropriation for beneficial use.” N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 72-1-1 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 40 of the 1st Regular Session
of the 54th Legislature (2019)).
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navigable waters was expanding to include tributaries that were not
in themselves navigable. 140 Through much of the next century,
federal power under the commerce clause expanded dramatically. 141
The Court was asked to rebalance these competing interests with
federal power gradually expanding. Congressional power to
apportion water illustrates this process.
In 1931, the Court seemed to backtrack on whether Congress
had power to apportion water. 142 Then, in 1963 the Court stated
unequivocally, “Where Congress has so exercised its constitutional
power over waters, courts have no power to substitute their own
notions of an ‘equitable apportionment’ for the apportionment
chosen by Congress.”143 This was a complete reversal of the position
taken in 1907. The Court went on to say that in 1928 Congress had

140

State of Or. By and Through Div. of State Lands v. Riverfront
Protec. Ass'n, 672 F.2d 792, 794 (9th Cir. 1982).
141

Kaiser Aetna v. U. S., 444 U.S. 164, 173 (1979) (Congressional
power under Commerce Clause is not limited to navigation but includes
any water that affects interstate commerce); Sporhase, supra 3.
142

State of Arizona v. State of California, 283 U.S. 423, 458 (1931)
(“The further claim is that the mere existence of the act will invade quasi
sovereign rights of Arizona by preventing the state from exercising its
right to prohibit or permit under its own laws the appropriation of
unappropriated waters flowing within or on its borders”).
143

Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 565 (1963).
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exercised its power and apportioned the lower Colorado River
between California, Arizona, and Nevada. 144 Congress again
exercised its apportionment power in the Carson-Truckee-Pyramid
Lake Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990. 145 The question then is
not whether there is substantial congressional power over water, but
whether there is a constitutional basis for congressional action.
E. State v. State
Much of the background for understanding conflicts
between states was discussed above. Three basic ways are available
to resolve disputes: an equitable apportionment with the Supreme
Court exercising original jurisdiction, a negotiated interstate
compact between states that is approved by congress, and
congressional apportionment. 146 None of these mechanisms are

144

Boulder Canyon Project Act, §§ 1–21.

145

Fallon Paiute Shoshone Indian Tribes Water Rights Settlement
Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 3289 (1990) (Prior to this act California and
Nevada had negotiated a compact. The compact was not approved by
Congress because it ignored Indian water rights in Pyramid Lake. The
congressional apportionment was used to resolve the impasse.).
146

Douglas L. Grant, State Regulation of Inter-state Water Export, 3
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 48.03 (Robert E. Beck and Amy L.
Kelley, eds., 3d ed. LexisNexis/Matthew Bender 2009); Douglas L.
Grant, Interstate Water Allocation, in 3 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 43.02 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 2014).
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satisfactory strategies for managing interstate water, at least in their
current form in the western states. Equitable apportionment and
interstate compacts will be evaluated below.
F. Equitable Apportionment
In Kansas v. Colorado, the Supreme Court established the
equitable apportionment doctrine as federal common law. 147 The
decision did not, however, actually apportion water. 148 Kansas could
not prove that it was being harmed by the irrigation practices in
Colorado. This result is not uncommon, 149 and the Supreme Court
would prefer states resolve such disputes through a negotiated
agreement—an interstate compact. 150 The Supreme Court has only
147

Kansas, supra note 138.

148

Id.

149

See also, Arkansas River--Kansas v. Colorado (1902 Court has
jurisdiction), (1907 The court chose to not interject as no demonstrable
harm was proven by Kansas), (1943 The Court determined Kansas is
incapable of showing redressable harm); Catawba River--South Carolina
v. North Carolina (2007 & 2010 still pending on the main issues);
Colorado River--Arizona v. California (1963 The Court ruled the
equitable apportionment standard does not apply for the ‘lower basin’ of
the Colorado River because there was a Congressional apportionment);
Connecticut River--Connecticut v. Mass (1931 Connecticut failed to
prove harm); Vermejo River--Colorado v. New Mexico (1982 & 1984
New Mexico lacked proof of harm), Walla Walla River--Washington v
Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936) WA couldn’t prove diversions to irrigators
in Oregon materially lessen the quantity of water for use in Washington.
Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 554–55 (1983) (“This Court
cannot rewrite the Compact so as to provide for a third, tie-breaking vote.
150
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apportioned water three times, the last time being in 1945.151 This is
not because the Court has had no opportunity, 152 but because of their
reluctance to impose a solution on states and the state’s difficulties
in proving the seriousness and degree of harm.
In equitable apportionment cases the Supreme Court has
primary and exclusive jurisdiction. 153 Instead of acting as a “trial
court” and determining the facts of the case, a Special Master is
appointed to collect evidence and preside over hearings. 154 These
cases are factually difficult and take an enormous amount of time.
For example, in Kansas v. Colorado the Special Master spent six
years gathering evidence resulting in 8,559 pages of testimony from

Moreover, the Court's equitable powers have never been exercised so as
to appoint quasi-administrative officials to control the division of
interstate waters on a day-to-day basis).
151

See also, Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); New
Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 805 (1931); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259
U.S. 419 (1922).
152

Id.

153

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.2.

154

Douglas L. Grant, State Regulation of Inter-state Water Export,
supra note 147.
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347 witnesses.155 There were also 122 exhibits. 156 More recent cases
have taken even longer and are even more complex with “dueling
experts.” At the conclusion the court-appointed “Special Master”
files a report with the Supreme Court, but the Court is not bound by
its recommendations. 157 Although they give deference to the report,
modifications are possible. In Colorado v. New Mexico, the Masters’
recommendation to give Colorado a share of the Vermejo River was
rejected twice.158
The equitable apportionment process has many problems. A
decision is not final since equities can change. In fact, in the first
dispute the Court encouraged Kansas to seek redress if the equities
changed as a result of Colorado increasing water use. 159 For
example, Kansas sued Colorado again over the Arkansas River but
once again failed to prove that Colorado was causing them

155

James Earl Sherow, Watering the Valley: Development along the
High Plains Arkansas River, 1870-1950 105-06 (1990).
156

Id.; Marguerite Chapman, Where East Meets West in Water Law:
The Formulation of an Interstate Compact to Address the Diverse
Problems of the Red River Basin, 38 Okla. L. Rev. 1, 33 n.195 (1985).
157

Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984).

158

Id.

159

Kansas, 206 U.S. at 117.
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“substantial harm.”160 The apportionment on the North Platte and
the Delaware River were also re-litigated and modified.161
Another problem is the uncertain outcome that faces states
when they begin this process. Uncertainty stems from several
sources. The factors used in making an equitable apportionment are
open ended. The weighing of each variable is unknown. In addition,
the harm done must be of “serious magnitude” that is “clearly and
convincingly proven.” What constitutes a “serious magnitude” for
Kansas may not be viewed similarly by the Supreme Court.
The last major issue is the Court’s inability to have a
continuing role in river management and their lack of technical
expertise to even participate. The decisions occur at a point in time
based on current circumstances. This means the solutions have to be
simple from an administrative perspective. In Wyoming v. Colorado,
on the Laramie River the principle of prior appropriation was used
but the boundary was not erased because that would require a federal

160

320 U.S. at 385.

161

Grant, infra note 147.
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water master to administer the priorities.162 In Wyoming v.
Nebraska, a percentage of the rivers flow was allocated because it
was simple to administer. In the Delaware River dispute a River
master appointed but the role there was strictly technical. 163 The
Court itself admits it does not have the technical expertise for
continuing management that is required for complex river
systems.164
G. Interstate Compacts
Interstate compacts are negotiated between interested States
and ratified by Congress, making them federal law. 165 Twenty-two

162

Grant, State Regulation of Inter-state Water, supra note 147;
Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water Allocation, in 3 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS § 45.07 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 2014).
163

Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945) (also appointed a
River Master on the Pecos River. This was not an equitable
apportionment case but one involving an interstate compact as will be
discussed below).
164

Grant, State Regulation of Inter-state Water, supra note 147;
Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water Allocation, in 3 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS § 46.05 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 2014).
165

Montana v. Wyoming, 563 U.S. 368, 386 (2011) (held that the
Delaware River Basin Commission was founded via the Delaware River
Compact P.L. 87-238 (1961). The signatory states, New York, New
Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania agreed to conjunctively manage
issues of flood control and water supply. The Susquehanna River Basin
Compact P. L. 91-575 (1970) was created to introduce cooperation and
comprehensive planning between the signatory states, Pennsylvania,
New York, and Maryland.).
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water compacts have been approved in the West, with the first
compacts being drafted and approved in the 1920s. 166 As compacts
require states to reach an agreement they frequently have severe
limitations that hinder water management. 167 Even after compacts
are enacted their interpretation is frequently the subject of
litigation.168 Three major problems occur with these western
allocation compacts: 1) limited scope of the compacts; 2) lack of
clarity in the allocation process and method; and 3) failure to include
a continuing administrative process and structure. 169

166

Boulder Canyon Project Act, §§ 1–21, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 617–617t;
Act Aug. 19, 1921, 42 Stat. 171
167

See generally, Zachary L. McCormick, Interstate Water
Allocation Compacts in the Western United States—Some Suggestions,
30 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 385 (1995). Zackary L. McCormick, The
Use of Interstate Compacts to Resolve Transboundary Water Allocation
Issues, Doctoral Dissertation, Oklahoma State University (1994).
168

These include (river basin included in parentheses); Oklahoma
and Texas v. NM (Canadian), Tex v. NM (Rio Grande), Kansas v. Col
(Arkansas), Kansas v. Neb., Mont. V. Wyo (Yellowstone). In addition
other suits have been brought by private parties for example, Hinderlider
vs. La Plata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Company 304 U.S. 92 (1938),
and Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann D.C. No. 5:07-CV00045-HE No. 10-6184 (2011). See generally HALL, G. E. 2002, HIGH
AND DRY: THE TEXAS-NEW MEXICO STRUGGLE FOR THE
PECOS RIVER, UNM Press, pp. 291., and Douglas L. Grant, Interstate
Water Allocation Compacts: When the Virtue of Permanence Becomes
the Vice of Inflexibility, 74 U. COLO. L. REV.105 (2003).
169

McCormick (1995) supra note 168. McCormick uses four
categories including “nonunanimous vote” and “dispute resolution”.
These are included under continuing administrative process and
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Western water compacts are limited in scope and focus
almost exclusively on the allocation of surface waters. In fact,
western water compacts prevent comprehensive watershed
management.170 They are inefficient in resolving problems that arise
subsequent to compact negotiation due to a limited purpose and rigid
structure. For example, ignoring groundwater hydrologically
connected to the compact river has caused many problems. 171 Only
one

compact

expressly

includes

groundwater

in

its

apportionment,172 while another specifically excludes it. 173 Two

structure. This term is used to match that used in the seminal article on
compacts. See also Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The compact
Clause of the Constitution—A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE
L.J. 685 (1925). The authors thought compacts had an advantage over
litigation because they resulted from a “sensible compromise” and would
provide for a “continuing administration”. See generally Grant supra
note 165. At the time the Frankfurter and Landis article was written not
many compacts had been completed. The benefits they saw did not in
fact materialize.
170

Howe, supra note 13.

171

For example, on the Pecos River groundwater pumping caused a
depletion in surface water supplies, leading to a shortfall in New Mexico’s
water delivery to Texas. See Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554 (1983).
A similar situation occurred on the Arkansas River. See Kansas v.
Colorado, 514 U.S. 673 (1995) and Alamosa La Jara etc v. Gould 674
P2d 914 Colo. (1983).
172

Amended Bear River Compact 1980. See generally Grant supra
note 165.
173

Klamath River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 85-222, § 1 (1957).
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others recognize that groundwater pumping may impact the surface
water apportionment. 174 By implication, groundwater has been
included by subsequent litigation when surface water flows failed to
meet downstream surface delivery obligations. 175 Early water
allocation compacts also ignore the connection between water
quantity and water quality. 176 Reducing the volume of flowing water
can have a direct impact on water quality. 177 Most allocation
compacts also exclude federal interests. Specifically, these include
reserved water rights, which were mostly unquantified when

174

Kansas-Nebraska Big Blue River Compact, Pub. L. No. 92-308,
(1972), and Upper Niobrara River Compact, Pub. L. No. 83-191, ____
(1953).
175

In Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124 (1987), the Court required
New Mexico to curtail ground water pumping to improve downstream
flows.
176

The Red River Compact specifically includes pollution as one of
its principal purposes as well as flood control. See Pub. L. No. 96-564,
94 Stat. 3305 (1980). Beck lists others. NEED TO INCLUDE purposes
of flood control.
177

Riverside Irrigation District v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. 583 (D.
Colo 1983).
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compacts were negotiated. 178 Failure to include federal interests can
lead to a rejection of the compact. 179
Allocation methods that seem like a “sensible compromise”
when negotiated often turn out to be controversial and challenging
to interpret leading to litigation. 180 Allocation methods are generally
based on storage (limiting the amount of water stored by the
upstream state), flow (dividing the water flowing in a river), or a
method designed to fit particular circumstances. 181 The critical

178

For example, the reserved rights of five tribes within the
Colorado River basin were not quantified until 1963. In U.S. v. New
Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978), the Court expanded federal reserved rights
by recognizing federally reserved rights on U.S. Forest Service lands to
secure favorable streamflows and for timber production.
179

President Roosevelt vetoed the Republican River Compact in
1942 because the compact negotiation committee lacked federal
representation. Congress did not ratify the California-Nevada Interstate
Compact Commission’s agreement. The agreement was ratified by both
states in 1971; the two states then executed the agreement without the
backing of the federal government. Edella Schlager and Yanya Heikkila,
Strengthening Cross-State Linkages to Improve Watershed Governance:
The Case of Western Interstate River Compacts, Published Abstract,
American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, (2007).
180

For example, there is ongoing litigation between Texas and New
Mexico concerning the Pecos River Compact, Texas v. New Mexico, 482
U.S. 124 (1987). A lack of quantification of water rights between Lower
Basin states led to litigation under the Colorado River Compact in
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). See generally, Felix
Frankfurter & James Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution —
A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L. J. 685, 749–54 (1928).
181

McCormick supra note 168. See also Grant, supra note 165;
although Grant states this slightly differently: “[C]ompacts must either
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factor in understanding the impact of a particular method is
determining whether the upstream or downstream state will assume
the risk in a time of shortage. A storage allocation limits the size of
the upstream state’s reservoirs. 182 This method seems like a
reasonably simple solution with the downstream state receiving only
the surplus above the storage allowance. The downstream state in
this instance assumes the risk that there will be a surplus.
Flows are allocated by three methods: percentage of flow,
use of models, and guaranteed quantities.183 As mentioned
previously, the percentage of flow was used by the Supreme Court
in its equitable apportionment of the North Platte. 184 With this
allocation method, states must agree on the percentage allocation
each state will receive and the point or points where to take
measurements. Risk of shortage is shared based on the percentage

(1) limit how much water the upper state can use or (2) guarantee the
lower state a certain amount of water.”
182

Canadian River Compact, Pub. L. No. 82-345, Art.2(d) (1946).
The Canadian River Compact was flawed because it referred to water
“originating” above a specific point on the Canadian River. The meaning
of “originating” was debated in Oklahoma and Texas v. New Mexico 501
U.S. 221 (1991).
183

McCormick (1995) supra note 168.

184

Supra note 150.
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allocation. Models can also be used as a means of sharing the risk
between two states. Models are based on scientific studies designed
to give a more rigorous description of a river’s hydrologic
conditions.185 For example, in the Rio Grande Compact, flowing
water is measured at specific upstream points, and a schedule of
delivery is used to determine how much water must be delivered at
downstream locations. 186 The Pecos River Compact was based on a
scientific study designed to reflect the river’s status as of 1947. 187
Unfortunately, the science proved incorrect, which lead to
litigation.188 Flow can also be allocated by upstream state or states
guaranteeing delivery of a specified quantity. If a shortage in flow
occurs the upstream states assume the risk and must deliver the
specified volume. Thus, on the Colorado River the upper basin states
have guaranteed to deliver a volume of water to the lower basin

185

McCormick (1995) supra note 168.

186

Rio Grande Compact, Pub. L. No. 76-96, Art III. (1938).

187

Pecos River Compact, Pub. L. No. 81-89, Art II (1948).

188

Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124 (1987).
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states.189 The guaranteed delivery was based on average flows of the
River that were substantially inflated. 190
Compacts must be approved by the legislature of each state
involved in the negotiation. Approval is a political decision focused
on protecting existing rights rather than a water management
decision. Although water managers may feel the best way to manage
a watershed is through a comprehensive and flexible system
incorporating an entire watershed, compacts are based on state
protectionism. If they were not, the politicians would never approve
of them. This leads to very weak administrative processes and
structures that make responding to change very difficult. Three
significant faults occur: 1) ineffective compact commissions; 2)
ineffective dispute resolution; and 3) state insistence in retaining
authority over water rights.
Compact commissions are the administrative structure for
interstate compacts. Unfortunately, only two-thirds of the compacts

189
190

Colorado River Compact Pub. L. No. 67-56, Art. III. (1928).

Jason A. Robison and Douglas S. Kenney. Equity and the
Colorado River Compact. 42 ENVTL LAW 1157 (2012).
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have a commission. 191 Even if there is a commission, there may not
be any permanent staff or budget supporting it. Frequently the
commission’s authority is limited to data gathering, but these may
not be binding on a court if litigation occurs. 192 Only a few compacts
authorize enforcement.193 Changes or amendments to compacts are
beyond the commission’s power.
If a dispute occurs, there may not be any internal mechanism
for resolving it. One evaluation shows that over half the western
interstate

compacts

have

no

specified

dispute

resolution

mechanism.194 This means each state has a right to veto any decision
forcing the dispute into litigation. In three compacts with more than
two states, a supermajority would allow one state to vote in the
negative and still gain approval. 195 Each state is given two votes but

191

Douglas Grant, Water Apportionment Compacts, in Water and
Water Rights, §46.03 (Robert E. Beck ed. 1991). See generally, Jerome
C. Muys, Interstate Water Compacts: The Interstate Compact and
Federal-Interstate Compact. (National Water Commission, Legal Study
No.14, 1971).
192

Douglas Grant, Water Apportionment Compacts, in Water and
Water Rights, §46.03 at note 87. (Robert E. Beck ed. 1991).
193

Douglas Grant, Water Apportionment Compacts, in Water and
Water Rights, §46.03 at note 88 (Robert E. Beck ed. 1991).
194

McCormick (1995) supra note 168, at Table 1.

195

McCormick (1995) supra note 168, at Table 1.
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requires three votes to make a decision (as long as a state’s
commission votes together they have a veto). Arbitration is possible
in three states, but it is not mandatory in two of them, which provides
a unilateral veto. In one state an ad hoc committee may be appointed,
but any decision requires legislative ratification. Two compacts
allow the federal representative to break a tie vote, but it is unlikely
the federal government would ever exercise this responsibility over
anything significant.196
Most compacts make it clear states want to retain authority
over water rights. Compacts typically include language like that in
the Red River Compact. 197 This means new appropriations or
transfers of existing rights must comply with the water law of the

196

Supra note 168. Of the 22 compacts, only one has mandatory
arbitration, three allow supermajorities to prevail, and the remainder, in
essence, give a single state a veto. Compacts were designed to be
ineffective and maintain the status quo. There is nothing flexible about
them. With changing populations, increasing water demand, and
uncertain water supplies, this inflexibility undermines the benefits of
compacts.
197

Red River Compact Pub. L. No. 96-564, (1980). Section 2.10
provides that “[n]othing in the Compact shall be deemed to: (a) interfere
with or impair the right or power of any signatory State to regulate
within its boundaries the appropriation, use and control of water or
quality of water.…”
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state of origin. This language is virtually identical to the boilerplate
language in the Reclamation Act and the Federal Power Act.
Congress generally does not play a substantive role in the
negotiations of these compacts, and most western allocation
compacts exclude federal interests. If the federal government is not
a party to the compact, it is difficult to believe Congress consents to
a burden on interstate commerce without making this intention
explicitly clear. 198
III.

BORDERLESS COMMONS

A critical aspect of the U.S. federal system is the limitations
placed on state sovereignty by the constitution. 199 These state
limitations were recognized in Gibbons v. Ogden.200 Striking a
balance between federal and state power over commerce has never
been an easy task, with debate harking back to the first

198

There is a compelling argument that states can unilaterally
withdraw from a compact. See Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water
Allocation Compacts: When The Virtue Of Permanence Becomes The
Vice Of Inflexibility, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 105 (2003). If this is true, can
the federal government be held accountable?
199

See Richard Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause as a
Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of
Constitutional Structure, 31 Wayne St. L. Rev. 885 (1985).
200

Supra note 62. In Gibbons the Supreme Court upheld the federal
power to regulate navigation under the commerce clause.
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Constitutional Congress. The Commerce Clause affirmatively
grants the federal government power over commerce. At the same
time, states using their police powers can regulate commerce.
Drawing the line between the acceptable exercise of state power and
an infringement on federal interests continues as a contentious
issue.201 These limitations, sometimes called the dormant or
negative Commerce Clause, are not accepted by all legal scholars,202
and one Supreme Court justice finds no constitutional support for
them.203 Strong arguments have been made refuting this position, 204

201

See generally Norman R. Williams, The Commerce Clause and
the Myth of Dual Federalism, 54 UCLA Law Review 94 (2007); Barry
Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence,
67 U. Chic. Law R. 1089 (2000); Eric R. Claeys, The Living Commerce
Clause: Federalism in Progressive Political Theory and the Commerce
Clause After Lopez and Morrison, 11 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 403 (2002).
202

E.g. Eule, Julian N. Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to
Rest, 91 Yale L.J. 425 (1982); Richard D. Friedman, Putting the Dormant
Commerce Clause out of its Misery, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1745 (1991); Amy
M. Petragnani, The Dormant Commerce Clause: On its Last Leg, 7 Alb.
L. Rev. 1215 (1994).
203

Justice Thomas does not recognize the dormant or negative
commerce clause. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997); American Trucking Association v.
Michigan, 545 U.S. 429 (2005); Hillside Dairy etc. v. Lyons etc. 539 U.S.
59 (2003). Justice Scalia has also questioned the validity of a dormant or
negative commerce clause.
204

E.g. Denning, Brandon P. Confederation-Era Discrimination
Against Interstate Commerce and the Legitimacy of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 94 Ky. L. Rev. 37 (2005).
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and it is commonly recognized that this provision creates a U.S.
common market—a form of borderless commons. 205
A. The Commerce Clause –Prohibiting States from
Discrimination
The standard used for determining the constitutionality of
state laws has evolved. During the 1800s states had authority to
regulate commerce using their inherent police powers unless the
regulation infringed upon national interests; statutes were
challenged using a local versus national comparison 206 and tried to
distinguish whether commerce was intrastate or interstate 207 or

205

H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond., 336 U.S. 525 (1949). See
also, Williams, Norman R. and Brannon P. Denning, The “New
Protectionism” and the American Common Market, 85 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 247 (2009); Konar-Steenberg, Mehmet K, One Nation or One
Market? Liberals, Conservatives and the Misunderstanding of H.P. Hood
& Sons v. DuMond., 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 957 (2009); Schragger, Richard
C. Cities, Economic Development, and the Free Trade Constitution, 94
Va. L. Rev. 1091 (2008); Williams Norman R., The Foundation of the
American Common Market, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 409 (2008); Denning,
Brandon P. (2005) Confederation-Era Discrimination Against Interstate
Commerce and the Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 94 Ky.
L. Rev. 37 (2006).
206

Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851); Henderson v.
NY, 92 U.S. 259 (1875); Wabash etc. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
207

The Delaware Railroad Tax, 85 U.S.C. § 206 (1874); W. Union
Tel. Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460 (1881); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1
(1888); Louisville, N. O. & T. R. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890).
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whether the impact was a direct or indirect impact on commerce. 208
Import bans were a common problem and were routinely struck
down.209 After Guy v. Baltimore, a case over fees imposed on vessels
from other states for the use of public wharves, discrimination
claims were sufficient for invalidating state legislation. 210 Even state
statutes not facially discriminatory, but which result in a
discriminatory impact, were struck down. 211 Import and export bans
were particularly hard to justify because of the inherent
discrimination in such bans. 212
The Supreme Court has used a variety of “tests” to nullify
discriminatory

state

statutes.

If

the

statute

is

“facially

discriminatory” a two-part test is used to scrutinize state statutes
strictly.213 They are upheld only if: 1) a legitimate local interest
exists that is unrelated to the state’s economic well-being, and 2)

208

Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99 (1876); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485
(1878); Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U.S. 289 (1894); Diamond Glue Co. v.
U.S. Glue Co., 187 U.S. 611, 616 (1903).
209

Railroad Co. v. Husen 95 U.S. 465 (1877); Leisy v. Hardin, 135
U.S. 100 (1890); Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1 (1898).
210

Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434 (1897).

211

Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890).

212

See note 196.

213

Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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nondiscriminatory alternatives do not exist. 214 Few statutes survive
this strict scrutiny, but one notable exception exists.215 For state
statutes that are not facially discriminatory but still have a
discriminatory

impact,

a

balancing

test

is

necessary. 216

“Evenhanded,” “legitimate” local purposes must be balanced
against “excessive” impacts which burden interstate commerce. 217
For this to be applicable, the statute must apply to an article of
commerce.218 Natural resources commonly sold in across state lines
make this determination relatively straightforward. For example, an
Oklahoma ban on exporting natural gas was unconstitutional,219 as
was a West Virginia statute granting its citizens preference in
purchasing natural gas. 220

214

Sporhase, supra note 24.

215

In Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) the court allowed
clearly protectionist legislation precluding imports to stand because of
the unknown parasitic threats posed by imported baitfish.
216

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); See Southern
Pacific. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) for an early use of a
balancing approach.
217

Sporhase (1982), supra, note 24.

218

City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (Is
garbage an article of commerce?); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322
(1979)(minnows); Sporhase (1982), supra, note 26 (water).
219

West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).

220

Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).

144

Seattle Journal of Environmental Law

[Vol. 9:1

Federal courts have also specifically addressed water as a
tradable commodity. In Altus v. Carr, a federal district court found
Texas an anti-export statute invalid. 221 Although the Supreme Court
did not necessarily adopt the reasoning of the District Court decision
in Altus v. Carr when it summarily affirmed it, 222 they did so in
Sporhase discussed below.223 At issue in Altus v. Carr was a Texas
statute prohibiting groundwater export unless approved by the Texas
legislature.224 Part of Texas’ argument was that groundwater was not
an article of commerce. However, in Texas, groundwater is the
personal property of the overlying landowners who are free to sell
what they pump.225 The ability to sell that water makes it an article
of commerce, making the Texas statute an impermissible burden on
commerce.
Three questions were answered in Sporehase: 1) Is
groundwater an article of commerce?; 2) Does the Nebraska statute

Altus v. Carr, 255 F.Supp. 828 (WD Tex) summarily aff’d, 385
U.S. 35 (1966).
221

222

Id.

223

Sporhase, supra, note 24.

224

Supra note 224 at 830.

225

Id at 833.
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impose an impermissible burden on commerce?; and 3) Has
Congress consented to what would otherwise be an unconstitutional
statute?226 In Nebraska, landowners did not own groundwater as
landowners did in Texas since Nebraska claimed groundwater
ownership.227 However, groundwater transfers (sales) were allowed
between users within the state. 228 The Court concluded state
ownership was a ‘legal fiction’ and groundwater was an article of
commerce. Dismissing this as a groundwater case ignores the
similarities to state surface water laws. Western states allow the
transfer and sale of surface waters under a defined set of
administrative or statutory criteria. 229 These statutes cannot impose
discriminatory burdens against out of state interests as they are
subject to the provisions outlined under the Commerce Clause.230
In answering the second question, the Court applied the test
from Pike v. Bruce Church. 231 If a state statute, “regulates

226

Sporhase, supra, note 24.

227

Id.

228

Id.

229

See generally, Pease, supra note 99.

230

Sporhase at 954 citing Pike at 142.

231

Id.
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evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its
effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose
is found, then the question becomes one of degree”.232 The Court
agreed Nebraska’s public interest in the conservation and
preservation of ever increasingly scarce water resources was a
legitimate local purpose. However, the statute contained a facially
discriminatory reciprocity provision that would only allow
exportation of groundwater to states that did not ban exports.233 In
this case, Colorado prohibited groundwater exports. Applications
made in Nebraska to export water to Colorado would be denied
Facially discriminatory legislation can be upheld if one of
two exceptions is found. First, if there is a state interest exception,
which was not directly considered in Sporhase.234 By finding the

232

Sporhase, supra note 26 at 942.

233

Id.

234

Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 US 794 (1976); Hicklin
v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429
(1980); White v. Mass. Council for Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S.
204 (1983);South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467
U.S. 82 (1984).
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state ownership doctrine a legal fiction, this exception is not viable.
The second exception is congressional consent 235; Nebraska argued
language in 37 federal statutes and interstate compacts deferring to
state law represents congressional consent. 236
Congressional consent to construct burdens on commerce is
not easily obtainable. Congressional consent must be “expressly
stated”237 and an “unambiguous statement.” 238 Congressional intent
must be “unmistakably clear.” 239 Congress must “affirmatively

235

Sporhase, supra note 24. New Eng. Power Co. v. New
Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982); South-Central Timber Development,
Inc. v. Wunnicke, Id; Maine v. Taylor; Northeast Bancorp v. Federal
Reserve, 472 U.S. 159 (1985); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437
(1992).
236

The Reclamation Act is typical of such language. In Sporhase, the
Court said “[s]uch language mandates that questions of water rights that
arise in relation to a federal project are to be determined in accordance
with state law.” (at 959 emphasis added). State laws controlling water
rights were already in place when these statutes were passed, and Congress
chose not to create a duplicative federal system. This is the extent of
federal deference. “Although the 37 statutes and interstate compacts
demonstrate Congress’ deference to state water law, they do not indicate
Congress wished to remove federal constitutional constraints on such state
laws. The negative implications of the Commerce Clause, like the
mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment, are ingredients of the valid state
law to which Congress has deferred.” (at 959-60).
237

Sporhase, supra note 26, at 959, New England Power Company
v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982).
238

Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).

239

South-Central Timber v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
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contemplate” before it consents to state provisions burdening
interstate commerce. 240 Therefore, boilerplate language deferring to
state law does not meet this stiff requirement. 241
IV. TARRANT V. OKLAHOMA

A. Red River Compact
Negotiations over the Red River Compact (Compact) began
in the 1940s242 and were delayed because of the influence of
droughts, concerns for water quality, and disagreements over water
allocation and storage. 243 The complex history of negotiations and
lack of water storage in downstream states, such as Louisiana,
contributed to one of the more complicated allocation schemes
found in an interstate compact.
The Compact goes into considerable detail allocating water
to the signatory States.244 Articles IV-VIII divide the River basin

240

Id.

241

Olen P. Matthews, & Michael Pease, The Commerce Clause,
Interstate Compacts, and Marketing Water Across State Boundaries, 46
NAT. RESOURCES J. 601 (2006) at 628.
242

Zackary L. McCormick, The Use of Interstate Compacts to
resolve Transboundary Water allocation Issues, Doctoral Dissertation,
Oklahoma State University (1994) at 213.
243

Id. at 214.

244

Red River Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305 (1980).
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into five river-reaches, and many of these reaches divide into
subbasins. Articles IV-VIII apportion water using both total volume
and percentage-based allocations. 245 At issue in Tarrant is Article
V, addressing the allocation of water between Oklahoma and Texas
– defined as, Reach II. 246 Section 5.05 states the “Signatory States
shall have equal rights to the use of runoff originating in subbasin
5”(emphasis added)--assuming specific instream flow requirements
are met.247
Section 5.05 is unique among interstate compacts in relation
to allocations of ‘runoff,’ which is a term of art within hydrology.
The term refers to “all water transported out of the watershed by
streams. Some of this water may have had its origins as overland
flow, while much may have originally infiltrated and traveled
through the soil mantel as interflow.” 248 After a precipitation event,
water moves as overland flow and subsurface flow towards rivers

245

Id at Art. IV-VIII.

246

Id at Art. V.

247

Id. at §5.05. Subbasin 5 is a watershed within Reach II as
defined in the Compact.
248

WARD, A.D. AND STANLEY W. TRIMBLE,
ENVIRONMENTAL HYDROLOGY 2d. (2004) at 119.
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and streams within a watershed. Runoff is generally measured at a
specific point downstream where the cumulative effect of all
flowing water can be measured, and includes every part of the
watershed.249 The Compact states the runoff originating in subbasin
five is to be equally shared. 250 In determining allocations of water
among the signatory states, Oklahoma argued “runoff” in this
portion of the Red River should be interpreted to include only the
disconnected tributaries originating within Texas. 251

This runs

contrary to the way runoff is measured and seems to be a denial of
the science associated with the hydrologic cycle as tributaries affect
streamflow downstream.
B. Tarrant’s Attempt to Transfer
In the early 2000’s, in an attempt to keep pace with rising
water demand within its district, Tarrant attempted to purchase
water from a variety of entities including parties in Oklahoma and

249

For example, the United States Geological Survey measures
water in the Kiamichi River in a series of gages.
250

The Signatory States shall have equal rights to the use of runoff
originating in subbasin 5 and undesignated water flowing into subbasin
5”, Red River Compact, supra note 248 at §5.05.
251

Tarrant, supra note 10 at 627.
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the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations. 252 In addition to these
pursuits, Tarrant endeavored to appropriate water from the Kiamichi
River and Beaver Creek – tributaries of the Red River in Oklahoma.
Tarrant chose the Kiamichi because of its lower salinity levels,
claiming other tributaries in the basin are not fit for cost-effectively
extracting potable water. 253
In 2007, Tarrant applied to the Oklahoma Water Resources
Board (OWRB) for a total of 310,000 acre-feet annually.254
Concurrently, Tarrant filed a motion in Federal District Court
seeking to enjoin the OWRB from applying Oklahoma’s strict
requirements for out of state applicants. 255 Tarrant could never meet
these requirements because they were intentionally designed to
prevent water exports. Tarrant claimed the Compact pre-empted
Oklahoma’s statutes since there was water within Oklahoma in

252

Tarrant (2013), supra note 10.

253

Brief of Petitioners Tarrant Regional Water District to the
Supreme Court of the United States, No.11-889 (2013). The Kiamichi
River is a moderate sized watercourse flowing through largely forested
lands. Because of its rural nature, and the predominate landcover, it
contains unappropriated water as it flows through Oklahoma.
254

Id.

255

Tarrant, supra note 10 at 621.
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excess of that allocated to them by the compact. 256 This
“unallocated” water should be available to Texas. Also, Tarrant had
a right to cross the border to obtain the water. This claim is
unprecedented and presumably would be exercised without regard
to Oklahoma law.
New appropriations and transfers of existing rights must
comply with state water law. Since Sporhase, western states have
passed specific provisions setting the rules for out-of-state
appropriations.257 But, Section 2.01 of the Compact noted each
signatory State is allowed to use the water allocated to it “in any
manner deemed beneficial by that state.”258 From Oklahoma’s
perspective, this created a separate class of water—one over which
the state has complete control and is outside the limits of the
Commerce Clause.259 Tarrant argued the state, as part of its
allocation process, can define beneficial use, but may not

256

Tarrant, supra note 10 at 627.

257

These rules must comply with the constitutional limitations on
state sovereignty implicit in the commerce clause.
258

Red River Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305 (1980) at

§2.01.
259

Supra note 246.
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discriminate against out-of-state interests; defining “beneficial use”
requires the same criteria be applied whether the use is in-state or
out-of-state. This would not be the first time water rights have been
enforced across a state boundary. 260
Also at issue was the question of whether the twenty-five
percent allocation cap found in Section 5.05 represents an
“absolute” provision to a signatory state or an initial allocation of
water.261 If this is an absolute provision of water, as Oklahoma
argued, the Commerce Clause would not apply and Oklahoma could
exclusively control the water. If the allocation cap represents an
initial allocation of water, then the Commerce Clause applies.
Unappropriated water should be available for appropriation by outof-state parties under Oklahoma statutes. These statutes must pass
constitutional muster. 262 In addition, compact water that is already
appropriated for beneficial use within Oklahoma should be available
for transfers out-of-state. Any appropriation under Oklahoma

260

Weiland v. Pioneer Irrigation Co., 259 U.S. 498 (1922).

261

Red River Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305 (1980) at

§5.05.
262

O.K. STAT §82-105.9-§82-105.11.
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statutes creates a perfected water right for which market
reallocations can occur between willing parties to balance supply
and demand.263 Assuming they apply these waters to a beneficial
use, these waters should be available to a party such as Tarrant. 264
In looking at Tarrant’s attempts to obtain water, several
different types of water are potentially available. Unappropriated
non-compact water should be available for an out-of-state user. An
out-of-state user should be able to purchase (transfer) a perfected
water right if the right is to non-compact water. If water is covered
by the compact, it should also be available for appropriation or
transfer; unless the Compact exempts this water from the Commerce
Clause. Although all these types of water were on the table for
Tarrant, they chose another variety “unallocated” compact water
available to them without regard to Oklahoma law. To put this in
perspective, an additional discussion of the Commerce Clause is
required.

263

For a more expansive discussion of this issue, see Grant, D. L,
Interstate Water Allocation Compacts: When the Virtue of Permanence
becomes the vice of Inflexibility, 74 U. Colo. L. Rev. 105 (2003).
O.K. STAT §82-105.2 “Beneficial use shall be the basis, the
measure and the limit of the right to the use of water….”
264
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The constitutionality of Oklahoma’s water appropriation
statutes hinges on their intent. The Commerce Clause creates a
common market within the U.S.265 Moving water, be it in raw form
or embedded in finished products,266 across a state boundary is part
of that national market. The Commerce Clause precludes states from
imposing “regulations that place an undue burden on interstate
commerce.”267 In Hughes v. Oklahoma, the court ruled state statutes
regulating interstate trade must do so evenhandedly and without
discrimination.268 This precedent was substantiated in Sporhase.269
The Supreme Court ruled that because water is an article of
commerce Nebraska’s statutes imposing restrictions on export were
unconstitutional. In City of El Paso v. Reynolds,270 a federal district
court struck down New Mexico’s water export statute, ruling states
could only discriminate “to the extent that water is essential to

265

Supra note 203.

266

Sporhase, supra 24.

267

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 579 (1995).

268

Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) at 331.

269

Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).

270

City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983).
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human survival. Outside of fulfilling human survival needs water is
an economic resource.”271
Tarrant argued Oklahoma’s statutes should be declared
unconstitutional because they impose unfair restrictions on
interstate transfers. For example, the statutes
“1) Require legislative approval for out-of-state
uses but not in-state uses;272 2) Prohibit the
Oklahoma Water Conservation Storage
Commission from granting permits for the sale or
resale of water outside the state;273 3) Put
additional requirements on water to be exported
that are not placed on in-state uses;274 and 4)
Require that long term water appropriations, such
as those needed for municipal development,
promote “optimal beneficial use of water” within
Oklahoma275.”276
Sporhase is the controlling precedent. 277 Oklahoma’s
limitations on water exports are protectionist. The questions at hand

271

City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. at 389 (D.N.M 1983).

272

Okla. Stat. tit. 82 § 105.12A(D);§ 1085.2(2);§ 1324.10(B).

273

Okla. Stat. tit. 82 § 1085.22.

274

Stat. tit. 82 §105.12(F); §105.12A(B); § 105.12(A)(5).

275

Okla. Stat. tit. 82 § 105.12(F).

276

Brief of Olen Paul Matthews and Michael Pease as AMICI
CURIAE, Tarrant Regional Water District v Herrmann. No. 11-889
(2013).
277

Sporhase v. Nebraska, supra note 24.
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are whether 1) Tarrant properly obtained perfected water rights or
properly appropriated unappropriated water in Oklahoma making
the case “ripe” for evaluating these statutes, 2) the Compact grants
congressional consent to an infringement on the national free
market, 3) the Compact left “unallocated” water within Oklahoma’s
boundaries and Tarrant was entitled to it. 278 The courts at various
stages determined there were no perfected rights that were ripe.279
Congress had consented to an otherwise unconstitutional
infringement on commerce, and the Compact left no water
“unallocated.”280
C. The Lower Court Decisions
After a complex case history, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit reviewed the Western District of Oklahoma’s
decision in 2011 preventing Tarrant from appropriating water. 281
The District Court granted summary judgment to OWRB finding
that the “Red River Compact insulates Oklahoma water statutes

278

Supra note 15, at 639.

279

Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 656 F.3d 1222, 1236
(10th Cir. 2011), at 4; Supra note, 15 at 638.
280

Supra note 15, at 639.

281

Tarrant (2011), supra note 279.
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from dormant Commerce Clause challenge.” 282 The court also
refused to address Tarrant’s challenges of Oklahoma export statutes
calling such challenges “not justiciable.” 283
The Court of Appeals then focused its review on the issue of
preemption, and whether the Compact gave Oklahoma “measures
that otherwise might violate the dormant Commerce Clause.”284 The
decision gave determinative weighting to language in the Red River
Compact.285 The Court found §2.01 gave each state virtually
exclusive domain over water allocated to it, citing precedent created
in New England Power v. New Hampshire and Lewis v. BT
Investment.286 The Court stated it is “well settled that Congress may
use its powers under the Commerce Clause to confer ‘upon the

282

Infra at 51.

283

Infra at 51.

284

Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann D.C. No. 5:07-CV00045-HE No. 10-6184 (2011) at 4.
285
286

Id.

New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331
(1982) at 340-341; Lewis v. BT Investment Mangers Inc., 447 U.S. 27
(1980).
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States an ability to restrict the flow of interstate commerce that they
would not otherwise enjoy.”287
The language in §2.01 of the Compact gives each state the
ability to “freely administer water rights and uses”. The Court
determined “[b]y ratifying that Oklahoma may “freely administer”
apportioned water and use it “in any manner” the state deems
beneficial, Congress conferred broad regulatory authority on the
state using unqualified terms.”288 The Court cited in its reasoning an
excerpt of the interpretive comments, which provide, “each state is
free to continue its existing internal water administration, or to
modify it in any manner it deems appropriate.” 289 The Court added,
“[t]he broad language of key Compact provisions inoculates the
Oklahoma statutes challenged here from dormant Commerce Clause
attack.”290 From this perspective, the Compact represented

287

New England Power, supra at 340-41, Lewis v. BT Investment
Managers, Inc. 447 U.S. 27 (1980) at 44.
288

Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann D.C. No. 5:07-CV00045-HE No. 10-6184 (2011) at 25.
289

Id. at 25, citing Appellate Application. Vol. I, 251.

290

Id. at 24.
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affirmative consent by Congress to infringe upon the Commerce
Clause.
D. Supreme Court
While the Supreme Court affirmed the 10th Circuit, it went
beyond the language contained within the Compact to rule that
§5.05(b)(1) did not create cross-border water rights that preempt
Oklahoma’s water statutes.291 The Court pointed to three factors to
determine that “cross-border rights were not granted by the
Compact:[(1)] the well-established principle that states do not easily
cede their sovereign powers, …; [(2)] the fact that other interstate
water compacts have treated cross-border rights explicitly; and [(3)]
the parties’ course of dealing.”292
Despite what the Supreme Court believes, Tarrant’s actions
are not uncommon. City and water districts regularly have standing
calls to purchase water while they simultaneously seek

291

Tarrant, supra note 15.

292

Tarrant, supra note 15 at 628.
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unappropriated water. 293 The Court also considered the gap of time
between the passage of the Red River Compact in 1980 and
Tarrant’s application for Oklahoma’s water in 2007. 294 The Court
believed that Tarrant, or some other entity in Texas, would have
attempted to claim Oklahoma water sometime before the 2007
application if they believed it was possible under the Compact. 295
Yet, the Court’s logic overlooks both the physical difficulties in
moving large quantities of bulk water and the rate of increasing
water demand during the 2000s in the Dallas-Fort Worth
‘metroplex.’296 To juxtapose the silence in §5.05(b)(1), the Supreme
Court cited the Bear River Compact which “unambiguously permits
signatory States to cross each other’s borders . . .” by stating “[N]o
state shall deny the right of another signatory state, any person or
entity of another signatory state, to acquire rights to the use of water

293

The cities of Santa Fe, New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico,
El Paso, Texas, and the Municipal Water District in California have all run
simultaneous efforts to appropriate new water and purchase existing
rights. See generally, Ari Michelsen and Robert Young, Optioning
agricultural water rights for urban water supplies during
drought, American Journal of Agricultural Economics (1993).
294

Tarrant, 569 U.S. at 637.

295

Id.

296

Id. at 634.
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or to construct or to participate in the construction and use of
diversion works and storage reservoirs with appurtenant works,
canals, and conduits in one state for use of water in another state,
either directly or by exchange.” 297 In evaluating the parties’ course
of dealing, the Court pointed to Tarrant’s actions and found it odd
that it would simultaneously seek purchases of water and attempt to
appropriate unallocated water. 298
The Court also addressed Tarrant’s claim that there was
unallocated water within Oklahoma to which they were entitled. 299
Each state received an equal share (25 %) of Reach 2 sub-basin 5.
Because §2.01 of the Compact gives each state the right to “use the
water allocated to it by this Compact in any manner deemed

Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 569 U.S. 614, 633-34
(1984); See generally Bear River Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-189, Art. VIII.,
94 Stat. 4 (1978); The Yellowstone River Compact also addresses this
issue stating, “[a] lower signatory State shall have the right, by compliance
with the laws of an upper signatory State, except as to legislative-consent,
to file application for and receive permits to appropriate and use any
waters in the Yellowstone River System not specifically apportioned to or
appropriated by such upper State…” Yellowstone River Compact, Pub. L.
No. 231, Art. VII, 65 Stat. 663.
297

“Tarrant’s earlier offer to purchase water from Oklahoma was a
strange decision if Tarrant believed the Compact entitled it to demand
water without payment.” Id. at 637.
298

299

Id. at 639.
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beneficial by that state.” 300 Oklahoma’s allocation of 25% of the
“excess flow” of water is for its exclusive use. 301 The Court added
requiring the OWRB to determine the total amount of water
available in Oklahoma beyond the 25% cap would be
“Herculean.”302 The Court’s finding is both disturbing and
surprising because precipitation data coupled with stream and
reservoir gages make such measurement possible. The United States
Geological Survey and the United State Bureau of Reclamation
compile these data with regular frequency and can estimate the
volume and speed with which reservoirs will fill after a given
precipitation event. 303 The Court’s willingness to categorize runoff
determinations as both laborious and logistically infeasible is
partially understandable since neither of the parties in Tarrant

300

Red River Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-564, §2.01, 94 Stat. 3305

(1980).
301

Tarrant, 569 U.S. at 639.

302

Id. at 634.

See generally Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep’t. of the Interior,
Manuals and Standards: Guidelines for Collecting Data to Support
Reservoir Water Quality and Hydrodynamic Simulation Models (2009),
https://www.usbr.gov/tsc/techreferences/mands/mandspdfs/hydromodels.pdf.
303
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presented conclusive data showing the runoff from within their
boundaries.
The Court evaded determining whether Oklahoma’s out of
state appropriation statutes violate the Commerce Clause. This was,
in part, because of Tarrant’s argument that some of Reach 5 was
“unallocated” and thereby available. 304 The Court stated, “[t]he
Oklahoma water statutes cannot discriminate against interstate
commerce with respect to unallocated waters because the Compact
leaves no waters unallocated.” 305 The Court does state Texas or any
other signatory state is free to challenge Oklahoma under Section
2.11 if they feel Oklahoma is applying more than their 25% share to
a beneficial use. 306 Tarrant’s claim Oklahoma infringed on its right
to apply unappropriated water to beneficial use failed "for the reason
that the Compact does not create any cross-border rights in signatory
States” and all the water was “allocated.” 307

304

Tarrant, 569 U.S. at 639.

305

Id. at 640.

306

Id at 639.

307

Tarrant, 569 U.S. at 639-40.
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E. Get Ready for a Rematch?
What is unclear is whether the provision allowing states to
“use the water allocated to it by this Compact in any manner deemed
beneficial by that state” 308 allows Oklahoma to prevent any
interstate transfer of water. This distinction requires seeing the
subtle difference between the allocation of water under the compact
and the ‘normal’ appropriation process by which a private party
establishes a water right. Normally, unappropriated waters are held
in trust by the state and are subject to appropriation. 309 Oklahoma
never objected to Tarrant’s claim unappropriated water exists in the
Kiamichi River, and the right of out-of-state parties to appropriate
unappropriated waters is settled law. 310 Denying Tarrant the
opportunity to appropriate the unappropriated waters of the
Kiamichi River creates confusion. In Tarrant, the Court stated that

308

Red River Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-564, §2.01, 94 Stat. 3305

(1980).
309

Gould, George A, Water Rights Transfers and Third-Party
Effects, 23 Land and Water Law Review 1-41, 28, (1988).
310

Tarrant, 569 U.S. at 632-33 n.10. (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 555
U.S. 555, 565-566 n. 3 (2009) which states ‘Congress does not cavalierly
pre-empt’ ” state laws, adding, “When the States themselves have drafted
and agreed to the terms of a compact, and Congress’ role is limited to
approving that compact, there is no reason to invoke the presumption.”).
For out-of-state parties appropriating water, see City of El Paso v.
Reynolds, supra note 3.
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the Compact did not grant cross-border rights.311 A plain reading
would suggest that the Court discussed water that had been allocated
under the compact, meaning Tarrant could not appropriate
unallocated water under the Compact. 312 However, it may be
possible for Tarrant to appropriate unappropriated water in the
Kiamichi River.
The Court did not address this specific difference directly as
Tarrant did not make this argument. This clearly leaves the door
open for Tarrant to attempt to appropriate water or to purchase
perfected water rights in Oklahoma derived from Oklahoma’s
allocation of Red River water. The Compact allows Oklahoma to,
“use the water allocated to it by this Compact in any manner deemed
beneficial by that state.”313
It may be possible for Tarrant to appropriate water for a use
recognized as beneficial in Oklahoma. It could also purchase
perfected water rights being used for a ‘beneficial use’ in Oklahoma.
These actions would fall beyond the narrow ruling of the Court. If

311

Tarrant, 569 U.S. at 634.

312

Id. at 639.

313

Red River Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-564, §2.01, 94 Stat. 3305

(1980).
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Tarrant does this it will either have to comply with Oklahoma’s
strict standards of review for out of state transfers of water or go
through a lengthy constitutional challenge using the standards
outlaid in Sporhase. If Tarrant had tried to perfect a water right
under Oklahoma law or attempted to transfer a valid right these
issues would have been clearly before the Court. However, Tarrant’s
flawed argument that unallocated water was present proved fatal to
its case.
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF TARRANT

Tarrant leaves unanswered questions about the transferability of
several types of water within a River Basin governed by an interstate
compact. Most major western interstate rivers are already governed
by interstate compacts, and the amendment process for these make
it highly unlikely they will be modified by the signatory states. 314
Many of these compacts were ratified before the ‘era of water
markets’ began in the 1970s, and it could be argued that many
contain language that is intentionally obstructionist. Like the Red

314

See generally Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water Allocation
Compacts: When the Virtue of Permanence becomes the vice of
Inflexibility, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 105, 180 (2003).
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River Compact, many compacts are devoid of explicit language on
water transfers across state lines.315
It is probable that the impact of Tarrant will be minimal—
the court determined the Red River Compact’s allocation scheme in
§5.05 fully partitioned the water in sub-basin 5, so Tarrant could not
claim water was unallocated. However, courts could interpret this
case more broadly as a precedent for other compacts. If so, the
question remains whether compacts that are silent about interstate
transferability means that those compacts fully allocate water
between states. For example, the Colorado River Compact was
ratified in 1928 and divides water between “Upper Basin” and
“Lower Basin” states.316 The Colorado River Compact does not
specifically allocate water between states, but does state, “[t]he
provisions of this article shall not apply to or interfere with the
regulation and control by any State within its boundaries of the
appropriation, use, and distribution of water.” 317 This language is

315

See generally McCormick, The Use of Interstate Compacts to
Resolve Transboundary Water Allocation Issues, supra 168.
316

See Colorado River Compact, Ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1064 (1921).

317

Colorado River Compact, Ch. 42, Art. IV(c), 45 Stat. 1064

(1921).
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similar to that contained in the Red River Compact. Does this rather
generic language represent an explicit intent to preclude voluntary
transfers of water across state lines? For example, if an irrigator in
Utah attempts to reallocate water to a buyer in Nevada, is that a
violation of the Compact?
Similarly, the Rio Grande Compact allocates water between
Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas using an inflow-outflow
model.318 Section 11 states, “…nothing herein shall be interpreted
to prevent recourse by a signatory state to the Supreme Court of the
United States for redress should the character or quality of the water,
at the point of delivery, be changed hereafter by one signatory state
to the injury of another.”319 Based on the Court’s quite literal
interpretation of the Red River Compact, does this mean any
change, even if accomplished through a voluntary transfer of water
rights between two private parties in differing states, is subject to
challenge via the Rio Grande Compact? Under such vague language,
can the state of origin preclude its citizen from exercising their

318

Rio Grande Compact, Ch. 155, Art. IV, 53 Stat. 155 (1938).

319

Rio Grande Compact, Ch. 155, Art. XI, 53 Stat. 155 (1938).
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perfected water right in a different beneficial use, and if so, does this
constitute legal takings requiring just compensation?
Oklahoma’s overtly protectionist statutes on out of state
water applications320 appear unconstitutional. The court did state
“nor do Oklahoma’s laws run afoul of the Commerce Clause,” 321
whether this is because there was no “unallocated” water, or whether
the court made a determination based on the validity of these statutes
was not specified.322 The Court’s statement runs in direct conflict to
the precedent established in Sporhase which recognized water as an
article of commerce and creates a high bar for exclusionary statutes.
This suggests the court did not address Oklahoma’s statutes directly.
Until future litigation provides clarity, the exact extent to which
Oklahoma or another state can impose barriers on the exportation of
water subject to an interstate compact remains unclear. 323

320

Tarrant, 569 U.S. at 624-626.

321

Id. at 640.

322

Id.

See George C. Coggins, Grizzly Bears Don’t Stop at Customs: A
Preface to Transboundary Problems in Natural Resources Law, 32 U.
Kan. L. Rev. 1, 16 (1983), and Olen P. Matthews, & Michael Pease, The
Commerce Clause, Interstate Compacts, and Marketing Water Across
State Boundaries, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 601, 656 (2006), for a more
expansive review.
323
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Tarrant also fails to clarify whether Texas or other states can
purchase perfected water rights from willing sellers in Oklahoma
and transfer this water out of state. Although the Court determined
that “the Compact creates no cross-border rights in Texas,”324
Tarrant or other water districts could possibly purchase water from
upstream water rights holders in Oklahoma and extract those waters
from the mainstem of the Red River at its South Bank. Under most
hydrologic conditions, Texas must already ‘enter’ Oklahoma to
extract water from the Red River as the border between the two
states is the South “cut-bank.”325 To stop a purchase, the OWRB
would likely invoke its water transfer statutes; such an action could
make the constitutionality of Oklahoma’s export laws ripe for
review. Such a scenario would seem to be similar in legal structure
to that of Sporhase,326 in which the Supreme Court shot down
economic protectionist statutes in Nebraska, unless the Court gives

324

Tarrant, 569 U.S. at 637.

325

See Oklahoma v. Texas 260 U.S. 606, 636 (1923).

326

See generally Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
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the phrase, “use the water allocated to it by this Compact in any
manner deemed beneficial by that state”327 determinative weighting.
Taking this uncertainty further, it is unclear whether the
ruling in Tarrant precludes ‘water wheeling,’ an associative
conveyance process by which water which would traditionally have
gone to user ‘A’ instead goes to user ‘B,’ and user ‘B’s’ water then
goes to user ‘C.’ Wheeling is conducted when physical barriers
make moving water directly from user ‘A’ to user ‘C’ difficult. 328
Wheeling utilizes the diffusion of runoff down a watercourse as a
way of limiting the amount of infrastructure needed. A niche of the
natural resource economics and water resource management
suggests consideration of wheeling as a method for redistributing
water between users in areas of adequate supply to those in areas
experiencing scarcity. 329

327

Red River Compact, 94 Stat. 3305, §2.01, Pub. L. No. 96-564

(1980).
328

See generally Timothy H. Quinn, Wheeling Provisions of the
Model Water Transfer Act, 14 HASTINGS W.—NW. J. ENVTL. LAW &
POL’Y 727, 738 (2008).
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See e.g., David Zetland, How Markets Can End Persistent Intraorganizational Conflict, 6 THE ECONOMICS OF PEACE AND SECURITY
JOURNAL 22, 22-28 (2011), and Terry L. Anderson, & Pamela
Snyder,WATER MARKETS: PRIMING THE INVISIBLE PUMP (1997).
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The Red River Compact, like many western interstate
compacts, ignores groundwater. 330 This is unsurprising; many of
these compacts were negotiated before conjunctive management of
surface and ground waters were legally codified. This omission has
had unintended and confusing implications. 331 Because ground
water is not covered under the compact,332 it is unclear whether
Texas could purchase groundwater from a willing upstream seller in
Oklahoma and extract those waters at the South bank of the Red
River. Geographical transfers of groundwater like this are legal
within Oklahoma.333 In Sporhase, the Court upheld an irrigator’s
right to transfer groundwater from Nebraska to Colorado, calling

330

See McCormick (1994), supra note 167.

331

On the Pecos River groundwater pumping caused depletion in
surface water supplies, leading to a shortfall in New Mexico’s water
delivery to Texas. See Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554 (1983); See
Emlen G. Hall, HIGH AND DRY: THE TEXAS-NEW MEXICO STRUGGLE
FOR THE PECOS RIVER 291 (2002), for a thorough review of this issue.
332

See Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 656 F.3d 1222, 1236
(10th Cir. 2011) (“Sporhase is distinguishable because Nebraska was
attempting to regulate the interstate transfer of groundwater that was not
subject to an interstate compact.”).
“Water turned into any natural or artificial watercourse by any
party entitled to the use of such water may be reclaimed below and
diverted therefrom by such party, subject to existing rights, due
allowance for losses being made by the Board.” Okla. Stat. tit. 82,
§105.4.
333
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Nebraska’s attempt to block the transfer, despite the fact the same
transfer would be legal in Nebraska “an impermissible burden on
interstate commerce.”334
The legality of transferring water from Tribes across state
boundaries is unclear. Tarrant attempted to transfer water from the
Apache,335 Choctaw, and Chickasaw Nations. 336 While those deals
fell through, the transferability of Tribal waters remains a
possibility. The Compact generically states, “[n]othing in this
Compact shall be deemed to impair or affect the powers, rights, or
obligations of the United States, or those claiming under its
authority, in, over and to water of the Red River Basin.” 337 This
suggests that the Apache, Choctaw, and Chikasaw nation’s waters
fall outside the purview of the Red River Compact. States would
find it difficult to argue tribal waters are subject to state review in
its attempt to block the transfer. It is unclear whether the state of
origin would have legal standing to attempt to block such a transfer.

334
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Tarrant attempted to include the proposed Apache transfer
within its challenge of Oklahoma’s Water transfer statutes. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s finding that the
proposed Apache transfer issue was not ripe. 338 As more tribal rights
are quantified, the transferability of these waters will lead to
litigation similar to Tarrant. At the time that Tarrant brought the
claims, neither Tarrant nor the Apache Tribe had applied for
transferring water with the OWRB. The Court stated that “[t]he
relationship between the Red River Compact and surface water
owned by the Apache Tribe is fraught with complex questions of
federalism, tribal sovereignty, and the reserved water rights
doctrine.”339 The Court also recognized this issue was not ripe
because it is unclear “what rights the Apache Tribe has to Oklahoma
surface water. . .”340 Tarrant’s legal strategy must be questioned. Its
first error was not fully pursuing water appropriations and perfecting
the rights before bringing this case. Tarrant also failed to purchase
rights making the case ‘ripe’ before the court challenge.

338

Tarrant supra 281, syllabus at 4.

339

See Tarrant, 656 F.3d at 1250.

340
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Most global Climate Models suggest water supply
vulnerabilities are likely to intensify in upcoming decades.341
Concurrently natural resource economists increasingly call for the
expanded use of markets to allow the price of water to reflect its
scarcity.342 Whether this case was a defeat for the marketing of water
in all river basins governed by an interstate compact is unclear. What
is clear is that Tarrant adds uncertainty rather than providing
lucidity on cross-border water transfers. The unique language in the
compact was the sole focus of the Court’s decision, suggesting the
decision is very narrow in scope. It is quite possible this decision did
not impact transboundary water reallocations.
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See generally IPCC, Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and
Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (2012),
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See generally David S. Brookshire et al., Western Urban Water
Demand, 42 Nat. Resources J. 873, 898 (2002), and George A.
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and Charles W. Howe, Protecting Public Values in a Water Market
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